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SOFT LAW AS FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
Jean Galbraith† & David Zaring ††
The United States increasingly relies on “soft law” and, in particular,
on cooperation with foreign regulators to make domestic policy. The implementation of soft law at home is typically understood to depend on administrative law, as it is American agencies that implement the deals they conclude
with their foreign counterparts. But that understanding has led courts and
scholars to raise questions about whether soft law made abroad can possibly
meet the doctrinal requirements of the domestic discipline. This Article proposes a new doctrinal understanding of soft law implementation. It argues
that, properly understood, soft law implementation lies at the intersection of
foreign relations law and administrative law. In light of the strong powers
accorded to the executive under foreign relations law, this new understanding will strengthen the legitimacy and legality of soft law implementation
and make it less subject to judicial challenge. Understanding that soft law is
foreign relations law will further the domestic implementation of informal
international agreements in areas as different as conflict diamonds, international financial regulation, and climate change.
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INTRODUCTION
The problems that dominate our political discourse, ranging
from economic policy to national security to the environment, increasingly have global causes and implications. But if our government
has developed multinational solutions to those problems informally,
through, say, arrangements among regulators, it has put itself at legal
risk at home.
We offer a novel approach to address that legal risk, one that we
think could make room for an embrace of global cooperation without
disparaging our traditional and constitutional values. Our insight is
that when international cooperation is the question, the deference afforded the President in foreign relations must inform the answer. We
argue that the President’s authority should be broadly construed to
apply not just to him but to his agents who execute the laws, thus
increasing the flexibility available to U.S. agencies engaged in international cooperation.
We think that President Obama himself would welcome this sort
of constitutional understanding. In 2010, he called for “stronger international standards and institutions” to deal with the modern
problems that inevitably cross borders and that affect our citizens at
home.1 In 2012, he issued a landmark executive order, “Promoting
1
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at United States Military
Academy at West Point Commencement (May 22, 2010), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-united-states-military-academywest-point-commencement (explaining that an “international order” is needed to “meet
the challenges of our generation,” including national security issues, global development,
and climate change).
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International Regulatory Cooperation,” instructing American regulators to coordinate with their foreign counterparts wherever possible.2
Moreover, from the perspective of his regulators, that coordination is well under way:
• In the wake of the financial crisis, the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board (the Fed) acknowledged that “the world is too
interconnected for nations to go it alone in their economic, financial, and regulatory policies.”3 The Fed has since devised
rules designed to stabilize American financial institutions in concert with central bankers and bank supervisors in the rest of the
world. This was done through a process coordinated not in
Washington or through an established international organization like the International Monetary Fund, but through a series
of informal meetings among various high- and mid-level banking
regulators from Europe, the United States, and a small number
of other countries in Basel, Switzerland.4 Among other things,
this process has resulted in the designation of twenty-nine international banks, including eight American ones, as “globally systemically important” and therefore required to adopt special
provisions to deal with the risk of financial crisis.5 The CEO of
one of these banks, JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s Jamie Dimon, has
claimed that the process will ruin American financial
competitiveness.6
• In a 2012 speech, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Director observed that “[f]or the FBI . . . the work we do will
almost always have a global nexus,” emphasizing the need for
“international partnerships.”7 The agency, accordingly, has conducted joint operations with European and other law
2

Exec. Order No. 13,609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,413 (May 1, 2012).
Julia Werdigier, Stimulus Alone Won’t End the Crunch, Bernanke Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/13/business/worldbusiness/13iht-13fed.
19314039.html.
4
Basel is the location of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which has
supervised the harmonization of these rules. For a discussion of the way the committee
works and the issues this raises for American regulators, see infra notes 242–51 and accompanying text.
5
Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions, Fin.
Stability Bd. (Nov. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Policy Measures], available at http://www.financial
stabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf.
6
Dimon, the CEO and Chairman of JPMorgan Chase & Co., told the FINANCIAL
TIMES that the proposed Basel III “capital rules are ‘anti-American,’” that the United States
“should consider pulling out of the Basel group of global regulators,” and that he was “very
close to thinking the United States shouldn’t be in Basel any more.” Tom Braithwaite &
Patrick Jenkins, JPMorgan Chief Says Bank Rules ‘Anti-US,’ FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 12,
2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/905aeb88-dc50-11e0-8654-00144feabdc0.html (internal
quotation marks omitted).
7
Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at the
American College of Trial Lawyers 2012 Annual Meeting (Oct. 19, 2012), available at http:/
/www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-transformation-of-the-fbi-and-the-rule-of-law.
3
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enforcement officials,8 pushed its foreign counterparts to sign
on to multinational standards on law enforcement surveillance,9
and, to facilitate both projects, pursued agreements outlining
the terms of cooperation with its foreign agency counterparts10
and established sixty-four “legat” offices across the globe.11
• While agencies have thus far mostly survived the judicial review
of their international efforts,12 there is a real sense that this review is about to turn much more searching as the degree of cooperation increases. In July 2013 alone, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) announced a major initiative revising the
inspection process for imported food, an approach designed to
represent, in the words of the agency, “global solutions to food
safety so that whether you serve your family food grown locally
or imported you can be confident that it is safe.”13 During the
8
See, e.g., Operation Atlantic: Taking International Aim at Child Predators, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2012/march/predators_
030112/predators_030112 [hereinafter Operation Atlantic] (“Europol released the results of
its first joint operation with the FBI against international child predators, announcing the
identification of eight child victims and the arrest of 17 individuals for child sexual molestation and production of pornography.”).
9
See, e.g., A Current Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Threats and
Countermeasures: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
109th Cong. 63 (2006) (statement of Michael Morehart, Chief, Terrorist Fin. Operations
Section, Fed. Bureau of Investigation) (“As it relates to international money laundering
enforcement, the FBI is an active participant in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).”),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg39713/html/CHRG-109shrg
39713.htm. The FATF is an informal group of agencies concerned with developing common policies to combat money laundering and terrorism finance. See FATF-GAFI, http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). For more on the FBI’s role in the
organization, see United States, FATF-GAFI, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/u-z/united
states/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
10
See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding for Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, Radiological and Explosives Investigative Support Between the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the International Criminal Police Organization (Dec. 19, 2011), available
at http://www.interpol.int/content/download/17585/142100/version/1/file/37-en%20
MoU%20for%20Chemical%20Biological%20radiological%20nuclear%20investigate%20
support%20between%20the%20FBI%20and%20INTERPOL%20(signed%20on%2019
%20December%202011).pdf (establishing “the framework for a cooperative Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives . . . program to advance the investigative
and overall operational capabilities of the FBI and INTERPOL”).
11
See International Operations, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/
about-us/international_operations (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (describing the FBI’s legal
attaché, or “legat,” offices).
12
For example, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture adopted a final rule concerning solid wood packaging material that
would standardize requirements among several trading countries that have adopted the
International Plant Protection Convention Guidelines. The Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) challenged the rule for violating the National Environmental Protection
Act and the Plant Protection Act, but the court granted summary judgment to the agency;
the Second Circuit affirmed on appeal. NRDC v. USDA, 613 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2010).
13
Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Takes Steps to Help Ensure the Safety of
Imported Food (July 26, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1), available at http://www.
fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm362610.htm; see also Foreign
Supplier Verification Programs for Importers of Food for Humans and Animals, 78 Fed.
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same month, the Federal Circuit turned away an Administrative
Procedure Act challenge to a deal concluded by the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) and Canada’s Ministry of
Trade to settle a dispute over traffic in softwood lumber,14 even
as the other appellate court in Washington—the D.C. Circuit—
held unconstitutional a delegation of government authority to a
private entity and a nongovernmental arbitrator because such a
delegation gave those entities “an effective veto” over government action.15 There is reason to believe that the FDA rule,
once finalized, will be subject to a lawsuit over how it has outsourced the inspection process, perhaps based in part on the
D.C. Circuit’s precedent.16

These are only a few of hundreds of instances of cross-border regulatory cooperation by American agencies.17 This cooperation has become a strikingly important aspect of U.S. foreign policy, even as it
affects the content of domestic regulations—creating net losers likely
to file suit in the process, as Jamie Dimon can attest.18 It also departs
from the traditional mold of foreign policy in two important ways.
First, from a legal perspective, this rise in international cooperation does not take traditional doctrinal forms. While some of it is memorialized in legally binding international agreements, much of it—
perhaps most of it—does not create international legal obligations.
Instead, as the former Legal Adviser to the Department of State recently noted, the United States increasingly relies on “non-legal understandings” to achieve its global objectives.19 Prominent among
such non-legal understandings are what we will call “soft law” commitments: agreements between executive branch actors in two or more
Reg. 45,730, 45,740–41 (proposed July 29, 2013) (proposing a rule “to help ensure that
imported food is produced in a manner consistent with U.S. standards”).
14
Almond Bros. Lumber Co. v. United States, 721 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
15
Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
16
The agency has already been sued over delays in issuing the rules by the Center for
Food Safety and the Center for Environmental Health. Carey Gillam, FDA Seeks End of
Lawsuit over Delayed Food Safety Rules, REUTERS, Dec. 3, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/12/03/us-usa-food-lawsuit-idUSBRE8B212420121203. Those groups have
also expressed dissatisfaction with the proposals that have been issued.
17
See, e.g., Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 323, 330 (2008) (acknowledging the “conclusion of hundreds of multilateral soft-law instruments” to date).
18
See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis & Joshua J. Newcomer, “Political” Commitments and the
Constitution, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 507, 544 (2009) (“It is not surprising . . . that the executive
now regards the political commitment [i.e., soft law] as an essential mechanism for advancing foreign policy interests.”).
19
Harold H. Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Speech on Twenty-First Century
International Lawmaking at the Georgetown University Law Center (Oct. 17, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/199319.htm; see also, e.g., David Kaye,
Stealth Multilateralism: U.S. Foreign Policy Without Treaties—or the Senate, FOREIGN AFF.,
Sept.–Oct. 2013, at 122 (“[N]onbinding arrangements may now be the executive branch’s
preferred way of doing business.”).
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countries that do not create legal obligations but which nonetheless
contain substantive commitments that the parties are expected to take
seriously.20
Second, these initiatives bring new parties into the international
sphere. While some soft law agreements, like the Washington
Communiqué on nuclear security and the Copenhagen Accord on climate change, bear the imprimatur of the U.S. President and other
heads of state,21 the bulk of these agreements are concluded entirely
between bureaucrats. They represent agreements not between the
United States and China or Europe, but between the Fed with the
Bank of England22 and the FBI with Europol.23 U.S. agencies outside
of the State Department have become international actors in order to
fulfill their own domestic regulatory missions, yet in doing so they
have found themselves operating in a sphere traditionally understood
to lie largely within the discretion of the President.24
How should we understand these developments as a matter of
law? The involvement of domestic agencies in U.S. foreign policy
raises vexing issues of procedural legitimacy, separation of powers,
and, in some cases, due process. But at the same time, it marks a
promising—and at times, the only realistic—effort by the American
government to address problems that cross borders with global solutions.25 It is also taking place at a time when courts and commentators have expressed deep skepticism about foreign influences on
American law. In recent years, the Supreme Court has cut back
sharply on the role that traditional forms of international law can play
20
We recognize that some scholars use the term “soft law” more broadly—for example, to encompass the decisions of international human rights committees or standards
promulgated by nongovernmental organizations. See, e.g., David S. Law & Mila Versteeg,
The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 834 (2012)
(discussing “soft law” in the international human rights law context); Gregory Shaffer &
Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 39
(2012) (discussing the role of nonstate actors and “soft law” in the production of international environmental law). Conversely, some scholars use terms like “political commitments” to refer to the kinds of agreements that we describe as “soft law.” See, e.g., Hollis &
Newcomer, supra note 18, at 516–25 (defining “political commitment” as “a nonlegally
binding agreement between two or more nation-states in which the parties intend to establish commitments of an exclusively political or moral nature.”). We have chosen to use the
term “soft law” to refer to nonbinding transnational agreements between executive branch
actors because the term is both convenient and frequently used in this context.
21
See Koh, supra note 19.
22
See Maximillian L. Feldman, Note, The Domestic Implementation of International Regulations, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 401, 411–12 & n.47 (2013).
23
See Operation Atlantic, supra note 8.
24
See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936); see also
discussion infra Part III.A.
25
Cf. CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 75 (2013)
(noting that “[g]lobalization . . . revealed, and in many instances created, problems that
could be addressed effectively only through international cooperation” in explaining the
rise of executive agreements post–World War I).
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in U.S. law,26 and the D.C. Circuit has looked skeptically on delegations of lawmaking power to international organizations.27 Even the
European Court of Justice has struck down a deal between American
and European regulators—though, of course, it did so not on the
grounds that American law was violated but rather, that the European
parties to the arrangement (an antitrust enforcement cooperation
deal) did not have the authority to conclude the deal.28 Commentators such as Curtis Bradley and Julian Ku have criticized arrangements
that mean that foreign agencies have a voice in setting the terms of
American rules.29
There is a real need to respond to these concerns and to provide
soft law with a sound domestic legal footing if America’s regulators are
to be permitted to continue working with their foreign counterparts.
We believe they should, given the current globalized environment,
where regulatory problems cross borders. While the implementation
of soft law through ordinary administrative law works up to a point, or
can if a number of assumptions about what administrative law requires
are relaxed (as one of us has previously argued),30 we think there may
be a sounder legal basis for this phenomenon. Specifically, we argue
that many problems of domestic administrative law would be solved by
recognizing that principles of foreign relations law—the law of the
26
See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (reading territorial limits into a statute that provides federal courts with jurisdiction over certain
violations of customary international law); Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522–25 (2008)
(raising the standard for concluding that treaties are judicially enforceable domestic law in
the absence of implementing legislation and further holding that the President cannot
require the states to implement otherwise non-self-executing treaties); see also Petition for
Writ of Certiorori, Bond v. United States, 2012 WL 3158880 (U.S. Aug. 1, 2012) (inviting
the Supreme Court to reconsider Congress’s power to implement treaties), cert. granted,
133 S. Ct. 978 (2013) (No. 12-158).
27
See NRDC v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 9–10 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that there is “significant debate over the constitutionality of assigning lawmaking functions to international
bodies” and interpreting the Clean Air Act and Montreal Protocol as “creating an ongoing
international political commitment rather than a delegation of lawmaking authority to annual meetings of the Parties”).
28
See Case C-327/91, French Republic v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 1994 O.J.
(C 275) 2, 3 (synopsis of judgment); see also Re the E.C.-USA Competition Laws Cooperation Agreement: France v. Comm’n, [1994] 5 C.M.L.R. 517 (unofficial report of
case). For discussions, see Noreen Burrows, No General External Relations Competence for the
Commission, 20 EUR. L. REV. 210 (1995); Derek Devgun, Crossborder Joint Ventures: A Survey of
International Antitrust Considerations, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 681, 706 (1996).
29
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and
Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1558–60 (2003) (discussing the democratic accountability, aggrandizement, and federalism issues raised by the transfer of legal authority
from U.S. actors to international actors); Julian G. Ku, International Delegations and the New
World Court Order, 81 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5–9 (2006) (arguing that the power to enforce judgments of international tribunals properly falls within the foreign affairs powers of the
President and Congress, rather than with the judiciary).
30
David Zaring, Sovereignty Mismatch and the New Administrative Law, 91 WASH. U. L.
REV. 59 (2013).
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United States as it relates to foreign affairs—should apply to soft law
agreements between American and foreign agencies.
By this, we do not mean that courts should refuse to decide lawsuits over rules resulting from soft law deals. Rather, they should presume, as one court has recently done for a rule with international
implications31 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), that “judicial review is particularly deferential in
areas at the intersection of national security, foreign policy, and administrative law.”32
To be more precise, foreign relations law recognizes that the
executive branch needs considerable flexibility in pursuing U.S. foreign policy and has developed a variety of doctrines that embrace this.
These doctrines include acceptance of increased independent presidential power;33 recognition that the executive branch receives
greater flexibility with regard to delegations in the foreign policy context than in the domestic context;34 a practice of frequent (though by
no means uniform) judicial deference toward executive branch decisions that relate to foreign policy;35 and a recognition that the certain
principles and rules found in administrative law may be relaxed in the
foreign affairs context.36 We argue that these doctrines should be embraced by agencies and applied by courts to put a thumb on the scale
in favor of deferring to the judgments of regulators that international
cooperation, or the harmonization of our rules and those in foreign
countries, represents the best solution to cross-border regulatory
problems.
There are two other advantages to our approach. First, soft law
agreements have been almost entirely ignored in the foreign relations
scholarship, even as they are becoming a dominant sort of international arrangement.37 While the two classic forms of international
law, treaties and customary international law, have been heavily studied in foreign relations law (including by one of us),38 soft law agreements usually receive only passing mention in foreign relations
texts,39 even as scholars in other disciplines have begun to pay them
31
The subject of the rule was conflict minerals, a topic to which we will return in Part
IV of this Article.
32
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13-CV-635 (RLW), 2013 WL 3803918, at *29
(D.D.C. July 23, 2013) (quoting Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 734
(D.C. Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33
See infra Part III.A.
34
See infra Part III.B.
35
See infra Part III.C.
36
See infra Part III.D.
37
See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
38
Jean Galbraith, Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 247 (2012).
39
See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
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plenty of attention.40 To the extent that soft law agreements are discussed at all by foreign relations scholars, the discussion is almost always about their formation rather than their implementation.41 This
Article shows how foreign relations doctrines can play an integral role
in the justification of regulatory globalization through soft law, thus
reading foreign relations doctrine into an increasingly vibrant field of
foreign affairs practice.
Second, foreign relations law has long been attentive to the relationship between the President and Congress.42 Our approach, consistent with bedrock principles of the doctrine, offers courts some
guidance as to how much deference to soft law arrangements is required with reference to that relationship. We think that it should be
all but absolute when Congress has endorsed the regulatory pursuit of
soft law arrangements, strong when Congress has not spoken one way
or the other, and weak when Congress has expressed a preference
that agencies do their work without turning to international regulatory cooperation.
We should acknowledge at the outset that our approach depends
on a new understanding of the basis for independence in foreign relations held by the executive branch. That basis traditionally lies in the
unique figure of the President, who is Commander in Chief of the
armed forces, the appointer of ambassadors, and vested with the executive power of the United States—and therefore is the traditional focal point for foreign affairs powers.43
In reality, however, the President is not a particularly important
player in most soft law agreements, other than the handful of
high-profile ones that he engages with personally. Our approach to
soft law agreements therefore requires disaggregating the executive
branch more than is commonly done in foreign relations law scholarship, even as we apportion powers that belong to the President in foreign relations doctrine to the bureaucracy under his putative
command. In this sense, we are arguing for a legal understanding of
the executive branch as “unitary,” that is, as a tool for the President to
conduct foreign policy and to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed, even as we recognize that the modern regulatory state is
anything but unitary.44
40

See discussion infra Part I.B.1.
See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
42
See Louis Henkin, Preface, The Constitution for Its Third Century: Foreign Affairs, 83 AM.
J. INT’L L. 713, 714 (1989) (identifying “[t]he most intractable issues of the constitutional
law of foreign affairs” as those “disputing the allocation of power between President and
Congress”).
43
See U.S. CONST. art 2, § 2, cls. 1–2 (setting forth these powers).
44
For enthusiastic paeans to the unitary executive, see STEVEN G. CALABRESI &
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO
41
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We also acknowledge that there are those who worry about the
sort of executive deference we commend, especially in light of some
unilateral and controversial actions taken by the President during the
war on terror. We recognize these concerns, but we suggest that
whatever the merits of executive deference in some contexts, when
applied to the soft law arrangements that are our subject, that
deference can legitimize multilateral solutions to global problems—
an outcome that encourages cooperation rather than unilateralism.
The rest of the Article develops the argument presented above.
Part I takes on soft law, explaining what it looks like and showing how
it is increasingly accepted in international law and administrative law
but overlooked in foreign relations law. Part II identifies the legal
bases for challenges to soft law agreements. Part III demonstrates how
doctrines from foreign relations law that provide the President with
increased powers could address those challenges to soft law agreements. Part IV applies these insights to real-world examples, taking
into account the nuances of how our broad approach will necessarily
depend upon the particulars of the soft law agreements at issue, the
domestic legal frameworks that overlap with the subject matter of
these agreements, and the agencies charged with implementing these
agreements. A brief conclusion follows.
I
A SOFT LAW PRIMER
This Part describes soft law and addresses how it has been approached in U.S. practice and scholarship to date. It will cover familiar ground for those already acquainted with the growth and spread of
soft law, but for those new to the field, it gives an overview that offers a
base of knowledge for Parts II, III, and IV of the Article, where we
make our main argument.
We attribute the rise of soft law to the pressures of globalization
and the difficulties inherent in creating “hard” legal responses to it.
As for the scholarly embrace of the field, we discern differences in the
way international law, foreign relations law, and administrative law
scholars have analyzed the soft law phenomenon. Despite initial resistance, the field of international law has come to accept soft law as an
important constraint on states and a source of business for lawyers.45
BUSH (2008); CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 170 (1991) (claiming that the unitary executive, as a concept central
to the separation of powers, is supported by various methods of interpreting the Constitution). For a more nuanced account, more consistent with our view, see Lawrence Lessig &
Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (1994)
(arguing that there is little historical evidence for the strong unitary executive theory but
recognizing that there are places where the interpretation is appropriate).
45
See discussion infra Part I.B.1.
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This acceptance has been hastened by the work of U.S. legal scholars
who draw upon the field of international relations to show that there
are a variety of ways of creating governance constraints on states. On
the domestic side, which is where soft law implementation occurs, the
story is more mixed. In contrast with international legal scholarship,
the field of law that deals with foreign affairs and the implementation
of international law in the United States—foreign relations law—has
almost entirely ignored soft law.46 However, soft law implementation
has been celebrated by some administrative lawyers—but more for its
potential than as a problem destined for the courts.47
A. The Rise of Soft Law
1. The Rise of Soft Law
As globalization has created markets, externalities, and public
goods that cross borders, bureaucracies have begun to expand across
borders as well. This is increasingly done through informal arrangements. The difficulties associated with the creation and implementation of “hard” international legal mechanisms—treaties and
customary international law—have driven the U.S. executive branch
and its agencies to consider and pursue less formal approaches to solving increasingly globalized problems.48 The result has been an explosion in nonbinding transnational governance standards that were
once scorned by international lawyers.49 In fact, the turn to soft law in
international governance has been one of the signature developments
in the field over the past forty years.
When engaged in the creation of soft law, at least as we define it,
substate actors meet with their peers from other jurisdictions to exchange information, coordinate enforcement, and harmonize the regulatory rules applied at home.50 In the international law literature,
this sort of collaboration is understood to have been pursued by
46

See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
See discussion infra Part I.B.3.
48
Former State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh has referred to these
nontraditional arrangements variously as “non-legal understandings,” “layered cooperation,” and “diplomatic law talk.” See Koh, supra note 19.
49
See Martti Koskenniemi, International Legislation Today: Limits and Possibilities, 23 WIS.
INT’L L.J. 61, 74 (2005) (noting that by 2002, there had been an increase in the use of soft
law, signaling a “turn from formal international legislation to what is usually called global
‘governance’”).
50
This process is reflected in President Obama’s landmark Executive Order 13,609
on international regulatory cooperation. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54
INT’L ORG. 421, 445 (2000) (explaining how soft law negotiation facilitates compromise
and “provides for flexibility in implementation, helping states deal with the domestic political and economic consequences of an agreement and thus increasing the efficiency with
which it is carried out”).
47

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN403.txt

746

unknown

Seq: 12

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

6-MAY-14

11:36

[Vol. 99:735

so-called regulatory networks, a widely adopted term that is meant to
underscore the informality and horizontality of the new regulatory
globalization.51
Regulatory networks appear in myriad areas where globalization
has affected a regulatory project shared across borders by agencies,
industries, and interest groups.52 Banking is just one of the many
areas where soft law agreements take place; it serves here as an example of how extensive soft law can become.53
In the world of financial regulation, which has been particularly
welcoming to such networks, American regulators have joined the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
(founded in 1983),54 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(founded in 1974),55 the Participants Group of major export credit
agencies (founded in 1978),56 the Financial Action Task Force that
deals with money laundering (founded in 1989),57 the International
Association of Insurance Supervisors (founded in 1994),58 and the
semiprivate International Accounting Standards Board (founded in
1973).59 In addition, the new Financial Stability Board (FSB),
founded in 2009, is meant to serve as a network of networks, coordinating the international harmonization of financial regulation done
by other financial regulatory networks and staffed, like them, by

51
The foundational work on regulatory networks comes from Anne-Marie Slaughter.
See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 12–69 (2004) (describing the
spread of regulatory networks).
52
See id. at 45.
53
See infra Part IV (discussing these and other areas).
54
See Ordinary Members of IOSCO, OICU-IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_
members.cfm?memID=1&orderBy=none (last visited Mar. 13, 2014); see also About IOSCO,
OICU-IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (identifying the
responsibilities and founding date of the group).
55
See Basel Committee Membership, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/
bcbs/membership.htm (last visited Mar 13, 2014).
56
See The Participants to the Export Credit Arrangement, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/
tad/xcred/participants.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (identifying the participants, responsibilities, and founding date of the group).
57
See FATF Members and Observers, FATF-GAFI, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/
aboutus/membersandobservers/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2014); see also Who We Are, FATFGAFI, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (identifying the
responsibilities and founding date of the group).
58
See IAIS Members, INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, http://www.iaisweb.org/IAISmembers-31 (last visited Mar. 13, 2014); see also About the IAIS, INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, http://www.iaisweb.org/About-the-IAIS-28 (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (identifying
the responsibilities and founding date of the group).
59
Int’l Fin. Reporting Standards Found., About the IFRS Foundation and the IASB, IFRS,
http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Pages/IFRS-Foundation-and-the-IASB.aspx (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (identifying the responsibilities and founding date of the group).
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domestic-agency officials from the various states that have joined the
network.60
This is all very well, but, as we will see, the legal risk for these
networks lies in the fact that the rules agreed to by the financial networks affect, often adversely, American firms, as JPMorgan Chase &
Co.’s Jamie Dimon has protested.61 Nor are the firms only financial:
diamond importers and web designers have found their choices to be
constrained by soft law institutions that seek to prohibit trade in
so-called conflict diamonds and to control the basic architecture of
the Internet.62
And businesses are not the only ones affected by soft law institutions. The government-sponsored International Olympic Committee
has agreed to be bound by the decisions of the Court of Arbitration
for Sport,63 which means that individual American athletes have been
also bound by decisions of the tribunal on their eligibility to compete—sometimes against their will. We will return to these examples
in Part IV.
2. The Evolution of Soft Law
The use of soft law agreements has grown and changed significantly since the 1970s. Important soft law agreements before then
dealt mainly with traditional matters of international affairs—the
treatment of aliens, military alliances, diplomatic relations, and the
like—and they were concluded by traditional diplomatic actors within
the executive branch.64 More recently, however, soft law agreements
have not only become more prevalent but have also emerged in areas
of law classically associated more with domestic than with international affairs, such as financial regulation, consumer protection, and
law enforcement.65 This development is in keeping both with the increased globalization of traditionally domestic challenges and with the
60
History, FIN. STABILITY BOARD, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/
history.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (discussing the history and founding date of the
group).
61
See Braithwaite & Jenkins, supra note 6.
62
For a discussion of these instances of soft law, see Part IV, infra.
63
See Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 61 (2013), available at http://www.
olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf [hereinafter Olympic Charter].
64
Examples include the 1907 “Gentlemen’s Agreement” between the United States
and Japan regarding Japanese immigration and the treatment of Japanese immigrants in
the United States; the Atlantic Charter between the Allies during World War II; and the
Shanghai Communiqué, which led to normalized relations between the United States and
mainland China. Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 18, at 516, 510–11; see also Oscar
Schachter, Editorial Comment, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements,
71 AM. J. INT’L L. 296, 297, 299–300 (1977) (discussing several other examples).
65
See Robert Hockett, The Limits of Their World, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1720, 1748 n.146
(2006) (noting the “explosion of attention now being paid to both (a) ‘soft law’ that
emerges from ‘networks’ or ‘epistemic communities’ of substate regulators, academics,
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rise in transnational interactions among regulatory actors. But we see
two reasons in particular for the growth of global soft law in the past
four decades and its even-more-striking acceleration in the wake of
the financial crisis:
• The difficulties and complexities associated with concluding
“hard” international arrangements, either through treaty, executive agreement, or customary law; and
• The acceleration of globalization, throwing the viability of a
purely domestic approach to any regulatory enterprise into
question.

The growth in international agreements in traditionally domestic
areas is not limited to soft law. Treaty practice has experienced a similar development, leading to a sharp increase in the regulation of domestic behavior through treaties.66 But executive actors often find it
advantageous to conduct their business through soft law rather than
through treaties. Because soft law agreements constitute a lessened
form of international commitment relative to treaties or executive
agreements, they can be negotiated and renegotiated with greater
ease and violated with lower reputational costs—and therefore they
can potentially contain stronger substantive provisions.67 In the
human rights context, for example, the choice to make the Helsinki
Accords a soft law agreement not only facilitated greater state acceptance but also produced an agreement with clearer and more specific
substantive provisions than those found in many hard law human
rights treaties.68
and affiliates of nongovernmental organizations, and (b) the ‘disaggregated state’ whose
officials belong to those ‘communities’”).
66
See Jacob Katz Cogan, The Regulatory Turn in International Law, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J.
321, 349–52 (2011) (noting how international law “is reaching ever further into the domestic . . . process to control how it operates” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
67
See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 50, at 423 (arguing that soft law arrangements are
often “preferable on [their] own terms” because they give states a way to protect their
sovereignty, deal with uncertainty, and facilitate compromise); Andrew T. Guzman, The
Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 579, 611 (2005) (noting that “soft law
represents a choice by the parties to enter into a weaker form of commitment” and emphasizing the trade-off between the credibility of a state’s commitments and the costs of a
violation); Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L.
581, 582–83 (2005) (distinguishing between the concepts of “pledge” and “contract” and
arguing that the preference for the contract form “often unduly weakens the substance
and structure of multilateral agreements” because states will hedge against their own
noncompliance by weakening the monitoring mechanisms or “watering down”
commitments).
68
See Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory
and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1832, 1840–41 (2002) (comparing the clear and detailed rules of the “soft law” Helsinki
Accords with the “more ambiguous prescriptions” of the “hard law” International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).
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Perhaps even more importantly, soft law agreements have the advantage of avoiding the cumbersome ratification processes that
domestic law can require of traditional treaties. In the United States,
hard law agreements above a certain threshold of significance require
strong support from the legislature: either the advice and consent of
two-thirds of the Senate under the Treaty Clause of the Constitution
or the approval of a majority of both Houses of Congress as a
congressional-executive agreement.69 By contrast, soft law agreements
“lie more completely within the domain of the executive branch of
government.”70
3. Soft Law at Home
The rise of international soft law has been accompanied by the
need to implement it domestically. This raises the question of what
laws or framework of laws can be used for its implementation. As suggested in the context of one international regulatory body, the answer
depends on “the expectation that individual authorities will take steps
to implement them through detailed arrangements—statutory or otherwise—which are best suited to their own national systems.”71
As a matter of practice, soft law implementation often falls
naturally to administrative agencies.72 Due to their domestic statutory
mandates and practice, these entities are used to operating under administrative law principles. Because of the rising need for crossborder cooperation in order to successfully solve regulatory problems,
independent agencies or bureaus within Cabinet departments have
become the primary negotiators and implementers of many soft law
agreements.73 To the extent that soft law implementation has attracted the attention of the executive branch more generally, the
framing and tools of administrative law have similarly been employed.
In 2012, for example, President Obama issued an important Executive
Order on “Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation.”74 This
order focused on having agencies consider international regulatory
69
See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 479, 584 (4th
ed. 2011).
70
Guzman, supra note 67, at 592.
71
Daniel Lefort, Bank for International Settlements (BIS): Basel, Switzerland, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 1, ¶ 172 (R.
Blanpain et al. eds., 2009).
72
See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 16–17 (2005) (describing how the regulatory decisions of international bodies may be directly implemented by those bodies themselves, “or, more commonly, through implementing measures [by administrative agencies] at the national
level”).
73
Some soft law agreements also require congressional legislation for implementation. See infra Part IV.A (discussing congressional legislation implementing the soft law
Kimberley Process).
74
Exec. Order No. 13,609, supra note 2.
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options and report them through the reporting process used in the
domestic regulatory context. It assigned the role of examining
international regulatory cooperation to the Regulatory Working
Group, traditionally a body that reviewed only domestic regulation.75
Most agencies, for their part, have, like the FBI, created foreign
affairs offices designed to deal with their foreign counterparts and to
negotiate soft law arrangements.76 Congress has occasionally, although not comprehensively, called for agencies to pursue international understandings—it did so in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform Act,77 and it has delegated to the USTR the ability to settle
international trade disputes.78 On other occasions, it has demanded
that agencies eschew international collaboration.79
B. Soft Law in Legal Scholarship
1. International Legal Scholarship
International lawyers and legal scholars used to ignore soft law
and even deride it as unimportant because it lacked obligation, which
75
See id. For the establishment of the Regulatory Working Group, see Exec. Order
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (rooting this group in administrative law principles); see also Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1755, 1816 & n.337 (2013) (noting that the Regulatory Working Group “currently meets
only sporadically” but that Executive Order 12,866 “may revive the institution”). President
Obama’s 2012 Executive Order came largely out of an administrative law background, as it
followed a project on International Regulatory Cooperation undertaken by yet another
administrative law body—the Administrative Conference of the United States. See International Regulatory Cooperation, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, http://
www.acus.gov/research-projects/international-regulatory-cooperation (last visited Mar. 13,
2014) (describing Recommendation 2011-6).
76
See, e.g., About the Office of International and Tribal Affairs (OITA), U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/about-office-international-and-tribal-affairs-oita
(last visited Mar. 13, 2014); Office of Global Regulatory Operations and Policy, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofGlobalRegulatory
OperationsandPolicy/default.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2014); Office of International Affairs,
FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/office-internationalaffairs (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
77
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 175, 12 U.S.C.
§ 5373 (2012) (providing for the cooperation of U.S. regulators with foreign counterparts
and international organizations). For a discussion of these requirements, see Alexander
Goodenough, Dodd-Frank: Regulating Systemic Risk in the Offshore Shadow Banking Industry, 3
GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 137, 152–54, 160 (2011).
78
See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (2012) (providing USTR with this sort of authority for
textile trade deals). For a discussion, see Frederick Davis, The Regulation and Control of
Foreign Trade, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1458–60 (1966).
79
For example, in 2011 Congress banned NASA and the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy from collaborating with cognate agencies in China. See
William Pentland, Congress Bans Scientific Collaboration with China, Cites High Espionage Risks,
FORBES, May 7, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2011/05/07/
congress-bans-scientific-collaboration-with-china-cites-high-espionage-risks/.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN403.txt

2014]

unknown

Seq: 17

SOFT LAW AS FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

6-MAY-14

11:36

751

they viewed as a critical component of a “real” legal system.80 But soft
law, as it has developed, has become at least an internal constraint on
what regulators see as their available options when engaged in matters
with cross-border implications, has affected the practices of thousands
of lawyers across the globe, and has managed to find creative mechanisms that have helped to ensure compliance.81
With soft law’s rise in international practice has come its increased acceptance by the international legal community. As far back
as Philip Jessup, international legal scholarship has recognized the
need to pay attention to nontraditional forms of international law.82
And as state practice has increasingly come to include nonbinding
commitments which are taken seriously by the producers of international governance within states, international legal scholars have come
to understand that excising soft law from the ambit of the discipline
would mean ignoring a great deal of the work that international lawyers and government officials spend their time doing.83 Soft law now
is not only widely recognized within the broader field of international
law but has also become the subject of extensive study by scholars
within the discipline.84 In the United States, the international legal
80
See, e.g., Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J.
INT’L L. 413 (1983) (criticizing the emergence of soft law for transforming normativity in
international law into a matter of degree, thereby diluting the certainty of rights and obligations under international law); see also, e.g., Jan Klabbers, The Undesirability of Soft Law, 67
NORDIC J. INT’L L. 381 (1998) (arguing that soft law is actually detrimental to international
law and the rule of law because it contributes to “smokescreens” that obscure the law’s lack
of autonomy from politics or morality).
81
See Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99
GEO. L.J. 257, 263 (2011) (“[R]eputational constraints inform the decision making of regulators in the same way that reputation disciplines heads of state who commit to international agreements. Furthermore, even where rules are not legally binding, they may still
influence the behavior of regulators and market participants seeking to make credible
commitments of efficiency, value, and strong corporate governance to investors.”); see also
David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 683, 685
(2012) (noting the importance of peer review in assuring compliance with soft law
requirements).
82
See PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956) (defining “transnational law” as
“all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers” and including
“[b]oth public and private international law . . . [plus] other rules which do not wholly fit
into such standard categories”); Schachter, supra note 64, at 301, 304 (recognizing that
although “nonbinding agreements are not governed by international law[, that] does not
however remove them entirely from having legal implications,” and concluding that their
nonbinding character should not obscure their usefulness).
83
See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 171, 180 (2010) (attempting to “better understand the impact of soft law” in light
of the fact that “[s]oft law has historically been relegated to the fringes of academic international law discourse, notwithstanding its importance in the actual practice of states”);
Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 18, at 540 (arguing that “[m]odern political commitments,” i.e., soft law agreements, “function in ways that the political branches cannot (and
should not) ignore”).
84
See, e.g., David M. Trubek et al., ‘Soft Law,’ ‘Hard Law’ and EU Integration, in LAW AND
NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 65, 69 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds.,
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scholarship on soft law draws strongly upon the field of international
relations.85 Anne-Marie Slaughter pioneered thinking about a variant
of international law as generated by transnational networks comprised
of national regulators, and much of the work studying soft law
embraces this approach.86 Scholars approaching international law
from other international relations framings, most prominently institutionalism, have also extensively studied soft law as a complement or
alternative to traditional treaties.87
One rough but quantifiable way to illustrate the rise in the recognition and study of soft law within international law and international
relations is to look at the appearances of the term in the flagship journal of international legal scholarship, the American Journal of International Law (AJIL), and in the flagship journal of international relations
scholarship, International Organization. AJIL has used the term in an
ever-increasing number of articles: between 1985 and 1999, the term
appeared in an average of 5.2 articles per year in the journal; between
2000 and 2012, the average increased to 9.6.88 An even more striking
increase is present in International Organization, which used the term in
3 articles before 1998, and since then has used it in 27.89 The interest
2006) (“In the literature in international relations (IR) and international law (IL) we see
increasing attention being paid to the role of soft law in multilateral governance.”).
85
See id.
86
See SLAUGHTER, supra note 51; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a
Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 285 (2004); see also Lawrence L. C. Lee, The
Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International Banking Supervision, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 2
(1998) (reviewing the actions of the Basel Committee and promoting the adoption of the
Basel Accords as soft law); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 3–4 (2002)
(explaining that “much contemporary international cooperation is not inter-national at all;
rather, it is occurring among discrete, specialized agencies of governments” through an
“adaptable and decentralized network model”); David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and
Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 547 (2005) (discussing “regulatory
globalization” and calling for an International Administrative Procedure Act); David
Zaring, Network and Treaty Performance During the Financial Crisis, 103 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 63, 65 (2009) (assessing the role of financial regulatory networks in the international
response to the financial crisis).
87
See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 50; Guzman & Meyer, supra note 83; Timothy
Meyer, Soft Law as Delegation, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 888 (2009); Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark
A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706 (2010); Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard Versus Soft
Law in International Security, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1147 (2011); see also Trubek et al., supra note 84
(approaching soft law from a constructivist perspective).
88
Authors’ calculations using searches run on the Westlaw database through December 2012; more detailed results on file with authors. These results and the results for International Organization are likely both overinclusive (because the term “soft law” is sometimes
used more broadly than we use it here) and underinclusive (because other terms are sometimes used instead of “soft law”), but they serve as a rough proxy.
89
Authors’ calculations using searches run on the Cambridge Journals database
through June 2013; more detailed results on file with authors.
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in soft law of international law and international relations scholars, in
sum, has grown measurably in the past decade or so.
2. Foreign Relations Law Scholarship
The intersection of U.S. law and international affairs has given
rise to a set of doctrines that make up what we now call foreign relations law. Aside from international law, the forms of law that fall
within foreign relations law—the Constitution, federal statutes, and
executive practice—also appear in fields of purely domestic public
law. Yet the understanding and interpretation of these forms of law in
the foreign relations context often deviates from those in the domestic context. The Supreme Court has long recognized that differences
exist “between the powers of the federal government in respect of foreign or external affairs and those in respect of domestic or internal
affairs,” observing the fact “that these differences are fundamental,
may not be doubted.”90 As we discuss in Part III, in general these
differences result in considerably more acceptance of executive
branch power in foreign relations law.
Foreign relations law concerns itself in detail with the formation
and implementation of hard international law obligations—treaties
and customary international law.91 Broadly speaking, foreign relations law recognizes three ways through which the United States can
enter into binding international law agreements: treaties made
through the process set forth in Article II, congressional-executive
agreements, and sole executive agreements.92 There is an exhaustive
academic literature dealing with the constitutional scope and limitations of these various types of agreements, with their implementation,
and with their relationship to other aspects of foreign relations law. A
similar literature exists with regard to the foreign relations law dimensions of customary international law.
Soft law agreements, by contrast, get barely a nod in the foreign
relations law literature. To the extent that they are discussed, it is
usually in the context of their formation rather than their implementation, and even here the discussion is sparse. The 1987 Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law spends less than a page on soft law
agreements, in contrast to at least eighty-four pages discussing hard
international law agreements.93 Although the use of soft law has
90

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936).
See Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J.
INT’L L. 259, 269 (1992) (“Hard law in the international area comes mainly from custom or
treaties.”).
92
See BRADLEY, supra note 25, at 31–32, 74–75.
93
The Restatement devotes an entire part to “International Agreements.” See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 144–229 (1987). Within this part, however, it only mentions soft law agreements briefly and does so mainly for the purpose of
91
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grown considerably since then, the foreign relations law literature has
not responded to this growth. The 2011 casebook by Curtis Bradley
and Jack Goldsmith, for example, mentions soft law agreements only
in passing, while devoting several hundred pages to treaties and
custom.94 Scholarship in legal journals shows a similar void. With the
exception of an article by Duncan Hollis and Joshua Newcomer considering constitutional issues relating to the making of soft law agreements, there is virtually nothing written about these agreements in the
foreign relations law literature.95 Moreover, their frequency is not
tracked in practice. Although reporting mechanisms exist for treaties
under the Senate advice and consent process, and for congressionalexecutive agreements and sole executive agreements under the 1976
Case-Zablocki Act, these mechanisms do not apply to soft law
agreements.96
3. Administrative Law Scholarship
Instead of foreign relations law, soft law implementation in the
United States now finds a doctrinal home in administrative law. However, administrative law scholars have embraced soft law more for its
potential than as a problem to be squared with domestic legal doctrine; few have looked into it, and those who have tend to be regulatory scholars with international bents.
For example, there is a rising school of “global administrative
law,” which has adherents in jurisdictions across the globe but is often
associated with the NYU School of Law, that is engaged with cataloging and evaluating all of the ways in which regulatory governance has
stating that this part “does not apply to agreements not intended to have [a] binding character or consequences.” Id. § 301 cmt. e & reporters’ note 2.
94
See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 69, at 479 & n.** (“Although not explored in
this chapter, it should be kept in mind that the United States also often makes non-binding
international commitments. These commitments, which are not ‘treaties’ under either
U.S. law or international law, can nevertheless be an important component of U.S. foreign
policy.”). See generally id. at 479–711 (discussing treaties and custom).
95
See Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 18, at 512 (describing soft law agreements as
“invisible” and noting that “[t]he question of whether and how the United States can enter
into political commitments [that is, soft law arrangements] with other nations has received
virtually no attention”); see also BRADLEY, supra note 25, at 95–96 (briefly noting existence of
soft law agreements and observing that “it is difficult to discern constitutional constraints
on executive authority to enter into these agreements”).
96
Information about treaties is recorded in the THOMAS database of the Library of
Congress, which is available online at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/treaties/treaties.html.
The 1976 Case-Zablocki Act requires the executive branch to report international agreements other than treaties to Congress within several months of their ratification, but the
executive branch does not interpret this requirement to apply to soft law agreements. See 1
U.S.C. § 112b (a), (d) (setting forth reporting requirements); 22 C.F.R. § 181.2(a)(1)
(providing that for an agreement to constitute an international agreement for purposes of
Case-Zablocki reporting requirements, “[t]he parties must intend their undertaking to be
legally binding”).
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become an international proposition.97 Another collaborative effort
along these lines might be found in Geneva, where Joost Pauwelyn,
with a series of coauthors, has evaluated the quality of soft law.
Pauwelyn calls it “informal law,” or IN-LAW, because it features informal processes, the capacious inclusion of new sorts of actors, and
output informality—on the usual administrative law metrics of transparency and effectiveness.98
Of course, some scholars—not many, but Richard Stewart is notably among them—have specifically considered soft law implementation in the United States, emphasizing an administrative law
approach.99
It is perhaps natural that soft law implementation is understood
as falling within the aegis of administrative law, since this is the field of
law that traditionally addresses policy implementation in the United
States. Yet as we show in the next Part, the fit is often an uneasy one.
Because U.S. administrative law was designed for purely domestic decision making,100 its laws and principles do not always map well onto
the kind of cross-border policy setting that soft law generates.
II
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROBLEMS

FOR

SOFT LAW

Ordinary administrative law poses some uneasy problems for soft
law, both conceptually and doctrinally. This Part reviews these
problems and posits that as cross-border regulation becomes more
and more important, the problems will only increase.
A series of foundational administrative law doctrines are difficult
to square with the way that international soft law institutions increasingly work. Indeed, one of us has argued that under ordinary principles of administrative law, at least as they have been traditionally
applied, regulatory globalization will never pass muster.101 This has
97

See Kingsbury et al., supra note 72 (two of the three authors are NYU professors).
Joost Pauwelyn, Informal International Lawmaking: Framing the Concept and Research
Questions (Project Framing Paper, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1738464.
99
See generally Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 81–82 (2005) (briefly noting some foreign
relations law connections); Richard B. Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S. Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 695 (2005) [hereinafter Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge] (pursuing similar themes); see also Feldman, supra note 22, at 401 (similarly
approaching the implementation of soft law agreements from an administrative law
perspective).
100
Cf. Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge, supra note 99, at 697 (“U.S. domestic
regulation and administrative law . . . has until recently remained splendidly isolated from
globalization.”).
101
See Zaring, supra note 30, at 38–63. If we relax those assumptions and look to the
underlying policies of transparency and responsiveness to guide our evaluation of their
legality, the right kind of institutions could pass muster—provided that Congress also endorses regulatory globalization more explicitly. See id. at 91–97.
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not stopped American bureaucrats from eagerly embracing their
foreign counterparts,102 nor should it. But it does expose them to
significant legal risk—risks that, of course, grow as those regulators
increasingly immerse themselves in an interlocking global regime.
These risks exist against a backdrop of suspicion about foreign
influences on American law. Justice Antonin Scalia, for example, has
argued that the idea “that American law should conform to the laws of
the rest of the world . . . ought to be rejected out of hand.”103
We have seen, and can expect to see in the future, challenges to
American participation in regulatory networks regarding delegation,
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) procedural requirements, and
due process concerns.104 As the Administrative Conference of the
United States observed in 2011, some agencies have been wary of international regulatory cooperation because they consider “that they
lack statutory authority to account for international effects when making regulatory decisions.”105
The doctrinal problems with regulatory globalization proceed
from a foundational disconnect between the local formality of administration and the informality of soft law generation. American agencies have particular procedural requirements, narrow grants of
authority in various substantive issue areas, and careful methods of
legitimization.106 But the “rules” of soft law do not embrace any of
these requirements. Instead, soft law has traditionally generated its
commands through a negotiated process among institutions that cross
borders.107 For American regulators, this poses a serious mismatch of
102
See, e.g., supra note 76 (listing examples of agencies that have established foreign
affairs offices for the purposes of negotiating and coordinating with their foreign
counterparts).
103
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
was referring specifically to constitutional interpretation, but his statement bespeaks a
broader theme of local democratic accountability.
104
See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (establishing the
three-factor test for determining the type of process due in administrative hearings);
NRDC v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (explaining that the nondelegation doctrine
prohibits an international body from dictating revision of standards to the EPA); Metro.
Council of NAACP Branches v. FCC, 46 F.3d 1154, 1164–65 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that a
commissioner must recuse himself if he had “made up [his] mind” on the merits of a case
in advance of a hearing (alteration in original)). For the APA, see Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60
Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
105
Admin. Conference of the U.S., Recommendation 2011–6 on International Regulatory Cooperation, at 4 (Dec. 8, 2011), available at http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Recommendation%202011-6%20%28International%20Regulatory%20
Cooperation%29.pdf.
106
See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 256 (6th ed. 2013).
107
See SLAUGHTER, supra note 51, at 44–45. These values are the reason why a decision
by the European Court of Justice, which has ruled that European antitrust regulators did
not have the authority to conclude a cooperation agreement with the United States, is
important. See supra note 28.
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process, and even sovereignty. These regulators’ work at home is
authoritative, but when they go abroad, their agreements lack the indicia of formality.108 The need for give-and-take at the international
level—and the subsequent need for domestic implementation according to the terms reached internationally—fits uncomfortably with
some of the premises underlying U.S. administrative law.
In this Part, we identify the doctrinal bases for these problems
and note a few sorely needed first steps that soft law institutions have
taken to address some of them. The amelioration is welcome, but the
need for a sounder doctrinal footing to justify U.S. participation in
regulatory globalization is required. We provide that justification in
the next Part.
A. Nondelegation and Subdelegation
The nondelegation doctrine prevents anyone else from playing
the legislature’s role as the provider of laws.109 Under it, Congress
may delegate a portion of that lawmaking authority to another institution—say, a federal agency—but the delegate must be provided with
an “intelligible principle” that cabins its discretion.110
Under current jurisprudence, this is not a high bar, as the
Supreme Court has turned away at least five nondelegation challenges
in the past two decades, and the votes have not been close.111 But
nondelegation nonetheless has teeth in two respects.
First, the courts of appeal keep sending up certiorari-worthy delegation rulings seemingly in the hope that the Court will crack down
on delegations.112 This concern about delegation is especially the
case when the delegation is international. As Curtis Bradley has ob108
Joost Pauwelyn notes that these agreements circumvent “formalities traditionally
linked to international law” having to do with “output, process, or the actors involved.”
Pauwelyn, supra note 98, at 15.
109
See LAWSON, supra note 106, at 61.
110
See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (articulating the “intelligible principle” test); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)
(“Applying this ‘intelligible principle’ test to congressional delegations, our jurisprudence
has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society,
replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its
job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”).
111
See LAWSON, supra note 106, at 108–14.
112
As Gary Lawson has observed,
In the slightly more than one decade from [1989] through [2001], the
combined vote in the Supreme Court on the merits of nondelegation challenges was 53–0 against the challenges. Which is more impressive: the
unanimous rejection of the challenges or the fact that the Court had to cast
53 votes during that time?
Id. at 114; see also, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Inherent Limits on Judicial Control of Agency
Discretion: The D.C. Circuit and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 63, 64, 94 (2000)
(criticizing the D.C. Circuit’s original holding in American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d
1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), modified in part, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding the EPA’s

R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN403.txt

758

unknown

Seq: 24

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

6-MAY-14

11:36

[Vol. 99:735

served, “transfers of authority by the United States to international
institutions could be said to raise ‘delegation concerns’” because
those institutions, unlike federal agencies or even American states, are
not accountable to any organ of American government.113 The idea is
that delegations to ungovernable, irreversible international institutions—even with an intelligible principle attached—are ones that
ought to be treated with particular suspicion.
Second, as Cass Sunstein and others have argued, the nondelegation doctrine evinces its sharpest bite when it is applied as a canon of
construction favoring narrow interpretations of statutory mandates.114
However, the more narrowly agency statutory mandates are construed,
the less justification they provide for engaging in international process
and the less room they offer to maneuver substantively.
The D.C. Circuit, the nation’s premier administrative law court,
and hence ground zero for challenges to regulatory globalization, has
proven to be particularly receptive to nondelegation challenges. Two
judges on that court, for example, have cast doubt on the ability of the
body designated by the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer to dictate revised standards governing those substances to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) because of the
nondelegation doctrine.115 They rejected the argument that “because
the Protocol authorizes future agreements concerning the scope of
the critical-use exemption, those future agreements must ‘define the
scope of EPA’s Clean Air Act authority,’”116 because such a de facto
amendment of the Clean Air Act’s powers would mean that “Congress
either has delegated lawmaking authority to an international body or
authorized amendments to a treaty without presidential signature or
Senate ratification, in violation of Article II of the Constitution.”117
The court also, in the summer of 2013, rejected the delegation by
Congress of rulemaking authority to a mix of public and private actors
and to an arbitrator.118 The court held that this statute crossed the
line between permissibly authorizing private parties to aid in rulemaking and impermissibly giving them “an effective veto” on the
interpretation of the Clean Air Act unconstitutional on nondelegation grounds and predicting the Supreme Court’s eventual reversal)).
113
Bradley, supra note 29, at 1558.
114
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 331–32 (2000); John
F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223. For
a recent take on the canon, see Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74
U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1674–79 (2007) (applying such canons to the immigration context).
115
NRDC v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(“Federal lawmakers cannot delegate regulatory authority to a private entity.”).
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process.119 Although this was a purely domestic case, it has potential
consequences for delegations to international regulatory bodies,
which the court might view as akin to private actors. In short, the
court has embraced the nondelegation doctrine in ways that may pose
problems for domestic regulators seeking to ground regulatory decisions legally or practically in an international consensus.
A further aspect of delegation doctrine—the subdelegation doctrine—is potentially even more problematic. While the nondelegation doctrine reserves some quantum of the power to legislate to
Congress and Congress alone, the subdelegation doctrine further provides that powers delegated by Congress may not, absent a clear statement to the contrary, be delegated by the delegate to anyone else.120
Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit has informed the Coast Guard that
the uncritical adoption of standards propounded by the International
Maritime Organization would violate the subdelegation doctrine.121
In that case, it warned that “if the Coast Guard had delegated some or
all of its decisionmaking authority under the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act to an outside body not subordinate to it, such as the
International Maritime Organization, the delegation would be unlawful absent affirmative evidence that Congress intended the delegation.”122 By the same token, it has rejected the delegation of
rulemaking authority by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to an internal sovereign—a state public utility commission.123
B. APA Procedural Requirements
Procedural disconnects also exist between the emerging prominence of soft law institutions and domestic administrative law requirements. Under the APA, the rulemaking process begins with a notice
announced to the world in the Federal Register, after which a comment period follows.124 After consideration of the comments, agencies may promulgate their final rules, with an explanation of the
reasons for the rule appended, and the prospect of judicial review to
119

Id. at 671.
Discussions of the doctrine may be found in David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201; Jason Marisam, The Interagency Marketplace, 96 MINN. L. REV. 886, 951 (2012); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1:
From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2176 (2004) (“The exclusive delegation doctrine suggests that the President and executive branch agencies can
subdelegate only if and to the extent Congress has authorized subdelegation. The exclusive delegation understanding tells us the Executive has no inherent authority to exercise
legislative power.”).
121
See Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d 913 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
122
Id. at 927.
123
U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
124
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012).
120
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follow.125 But, of course, soft law institutions do not require notice
and do not publicize their work in the Federal Register (or, sometimes, anywhere), nor are they required to offer comment periods.126
Moreover, they have different approaches to responding to outside
inquiries than do American agencies, which culminate not in direct
judicial review but rather in the domestic implementation of the
agreed-upon international rules or policies.127
These procedural differences create serious tensions. While a
federal agency would have difficulty proposing a rule before soft law
negotiations (since the content of the rule would presumably depend
upon the outcome of these negotiations), it could try both proposing
and then finalizing its rule after a soft law consensus has been
reached. But this approach would be at odds with the point of ventilating an administrative proposal before the public. In implementing
the first Basel Accord in the late 1980s, for example, the Fed rejected
various features proposed by commentators on the simple ground
that “the [Basel] Accord does not recognize” these features and therefore they “would be inconsistent with the framework agreed upon by
the G-10 countries.”128 The more an agency relies on this kind of reasoning, the less meaningful the notice-and-comment process is.
Indeed, the charade can create litigation risk; if an agency’s mind is
unalterably fixed before it begins the rulemaking, courts have found
its process to be lacking.129
C. Due Process Concerns
Finally, there are due process concerns inherent in the fact that
when soft law institutions make particularized determinations they will
125

Id. § 553(c)–(d).
Recall that these procedural safeguards required by the Administrative Procedure
Act do not apply to soft law institutions, which are international entities not governed by
statute. Cf. Kingsbury et al., supra note 72, at 33 (noting that while “some federal regulatory officials afford notice and comment when participating in international standardsetting on certain topics,” so far “these types of efforts are episodic and fragmented”).
127
See Lefort, supra note 71 and accompanying text.
128
Feldman, supra note 22, at 416 (quoting Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 54 Fed.
Reg. 4186, 4190–91 (Jan. 27, 1989) (codified as amended at 12 C.F.R. pts. 208, 225)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 415–20 (describing how, while the Fed
changed its proposed approach in response to some of the six issues substantially contested
by commentators, in no case did the Fed act inconsistently with the Basel Accord).
Feldman does find occasional willingness by the Fed to deviate from the framework of the
second Basel Accord in ways that were inconsistent with that Accord. See id. at 424–25.
129
“[W]e will set aside a commission member’s decision not to recuse himself from his
duties only where he has ‘demonstrably made up [his] mind about important and specific
factual questions and [is] impervious to contrary evidence.’” Metro. Council of NAACP
Branches v. FCC, 46 F.3d 1154, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see also C & W Fish Co. v. Fox, 931 F.2d
1556, 1565 (1991) (identifying an “unalterably closed mind” as the test for disqualifying a
rule maker (internal quotation marks omitted)).
126
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not necessarily offer the kind of hearing to affected American
businesses and individuals that ordinarily would be required.130 As
Margaret Chon has explained, “[t]he questions of due process within
the standard-setting process, potential abuse of market position, and
related issues have long been a concern with respect to the decentralized promulgation of standards.”131 Determining the kind of process
due in these cases usually requires a look at the oft-invoked
three-factor test in Mathews v. Eldridge :
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.132

Due process’s reach in international matters depends, as we will
see, on the matter at issue. In American administrative law jurisprudence, due process is invoked to protect citizens faced with individualized determinations of their rights and duties, and traditionally
requires “some kind of hearing” when a deprivation of life, property,
or liberty is at issue.133 But internationally, when the goal is harmonization, or mutual recognition, or something as diffuse as enforcement
cooperation or the devising of best practices, there is unlikely to be a
clear link between the global rule and any individualized deprivation.
But increasingly, international soft law is striving to make more calibrated decisions; those decisions do create a domestic due process
problem out of a global process.
An example might be found in the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision and FSB’s determination of which institutions constituted
Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs).134 The
130

See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
Margaret Chon, Marks of Rectitude, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2311, 2318 (2009).
132
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 263–71 (1970)).
133
See Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1267–68
(1975).
134
The FSB made the determination using a methodology developed by the Basel
Committee. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT
BANKS: ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND THE ADDITIONAL LOSS ABSORBENCY REQUIREMENT
(2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207.pdf; Policy Measures, supra note 5.
For a discussion of G-SIFIs, see Edward F. Greene & Joshua L. Boehm, The Limits of
“Name-and-Shame” in International Financial Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1083, 1087
(2012) (“For global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs), where active
oversight and prompt enforcement are indispensable, only deeper and binding efforts can
ensure effective supervision, recovery, and resolution.”); Randall D. Guynn, Are Bailouts
Inevitable?, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 122 (2012) (“Policymakers have therefore been searching for ways to make taxpayer-funded bailouts of systemically important financial institu131
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Basel Committee and Financial Stability Board identified twenty-nine
such institutions in its initial G-SIFI determination, and it has updated
the list annually.135 Eight of the institutions on the first list are
American; the FSB has since instructed American regulators to increase the capital requirements on these institutions.136 It is precisely
these kinds of particularized determinations that might lead to a deprivation of property that American courts since the turn of the twentieth century have subjected to the requirement of “some kind of
hearing.”137
REFRAMING SOFT LAW

III
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

AS

The imperfect fit between administrative law and the implementation of soft law agreements demonstrates the need for a better
framework going forward. We argue here that foreign relations law
can give soft law a much firmer conceptual and doctrinal footing in
U.S. law and help further empower this useful form of law. Our argument, however, depends on a broadening of the traditional basis of
foreign relations deference from the President alone, to the President
and his agents.
The application of different constitutional principles to foreign
affairs and domestic ones has long-standing roots. It goes back to the
nation’s founding, as exemplified by Thomas Jefferson’s vision of the
states being “one as to everything connected with foreign nations, and
several as to everything purely domestic.”138 While these differences
have been and continue to be contested, as a matter of practice they
have become ingrained in a distinctive set of doctrines that make up
the “foreign affairs constitution.”139
tions (SIFIs) a thing of the past.”); David Zaring, Who Are the G-SIFIs?, THE CONGLOMERATE
(Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/12/who-are-the-g-sifis.html.
135
See Policy Measures, supra note 5, at 4.
136
See Jonathan Macey, It’s All Shadow Banking, Actually, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 593,
607 (2012) (“In late 2011, the FSB embraced the view that risk to the global financial
system was posed by what are known as ‘global systemically important financial institutions,’ or G-SIFIs. G-SIFIs are defined as those financial institutions ‘whose distress or disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would
cause significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity.’”); David
Zaring, The 28 G-SIFIs, As Selected by the Financial Stability Board, THE CONGLOMERATE (Nov. 7,
2012), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2012/11/the-28-g-sifis-as-selected-by-thefinancial-stability-board.html (“Lawyers have a term for that sort of determination: it is
called an ‘adjudication.’”).
137
See Friendly, supra note 133, at 1278–79 (describing the jurisprudence on when
such hearings are required).
138
Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Edward Carrington (Aug. 4, 1787), in LETTERS AND
ADDRESSES OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 63 (William B. Parker & Jonas Viles eds., 1905).
139
There is a rich debate over the extent to which the foreign affairs constitution does
and should differ from domestic constitutional law. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 42, at 716
(noting “the need for a fresh look at old dogma” but also observing that “[f]oreign affairs
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A key feature of the foreign affairs constitution is that the
President assumes the “lion’s share” of foreign affairs power under
it,140 with the President embodying the executive branch in some
ill-defined way. This development, which stems from historical and
functional reasons, at first applied mainly to international dealings
such as diplomatic relations and international negotiations.141 But
gradually it has also come to influence the implementation within the
United States of decision making based on foreign affairs concerns, as
we will discuss below. The doctrines that make up the foreign affairs
constitution boost the executive branch’s power in several different
ways. Some increase the power of the executive branch to act despite
the absence of statutory authority (and sometimes even in opposition
to this authority). Perhaps more importantly, other doctrines expand
the range of powers that are available to the President in interpreting
and implementing statutes, in part by empowering the President and
in part by depowering the courts and the states. We focus here on
four aspects of foreign relations law: presidential power over foreign
affairs, acceptance of broader delegations, increased deference, and
reduced procedural obligations.142
Applying these principles to soft law agreements, however, requires expansive understandings of the reach of the President’s foreign affairs powers within the executive branch and of the foreign
affairs exemption in the APA. As to the former, foreign affairs
deference is often justified with reference to the unique constitutional
role given the President to conduct foreign affairs.143 Because the
are likely to remain constitutionally ‘special’ in the next century, as they have been in the
past two”); Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J.
649, 649 (2002) (arguing that the foreign affairs constitution rests on outdated premises in
light of trends accompanying the rise of globalization). We do not engage these debates
here but rather focus on considering what the current set of doctrines that exist in practice
may have to offer to soft law. It may well be that principles of foreign relations law need
reexamining. Our argument here is simply that, conditional on their existence, they
should apply to soft law agreements.
140
EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 208 (3d ed. 1948).
141
See Henkin, supra note 42, at 713–14.
142
We focus here on the set of foreign relations law principles that we think are likely
to increase executive branch strength and flexibility in soft law practice. This set is not
exhaustive. For example, we do not discuss the reduced application of federalism canons
in the foreign relations law, even though this could arguably assist the executive branch in
soft law implementation in certain contexts. Nor do we discuss Appointments Clause issues, although foreign relations law may authorize greater reliance than administrative law
on the use of officials who have not undergone the Senate confirmation process. Our
focus is on the doctrines that we perceive as addressing the tensions identified in Part II. It
is also worth noting that nonbinding international cooperation can occur through actors
other than the federal executive branch—such as through the actions of U.S. state governments and nonstate actors. Our argument here does not address these forms of cooperation (other than to the extent that there is federal executive branch involvement in them).
143
See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (asserting that “[i]n [the] vast external realm [of foreign affairs], with its important,
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President has never exercised those unique powers alone without the
help of subordinates, we argue that they rub off on the other agencies
in the government—in this sense, you might call us enthusiasts of a
form of unitary executive theory who nonetheless have welcomed the
fragmentation of the administrative state. And as to the foreign affairs
exemption in the APA, we see no reason to apply it solely to the work
of the President and his generals and diplomats, given that so many
other agencies are necessarily involved in international affairs in their
own right.
One way to think about how these doctrines might apply is to
consider them in relation to the continuum proposed by Justice
Robert Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.144 In his
continuum, congressional endorsement is presumed to mark the apogee of presidential authority, congressional silence creates a zone
under which the President is often empowered to act under his independent powers, and congressional disapproval puts the President’s
power at its “lowest ebb.”145
This continuum applies in foreign relations law as in domestic
law, and we think it is useful in understanding the power of agencies
to engage in soft law. Where Congress has encouraged overseas collaboration, courts should be especially deferential when reviewing the
fruits of such collaboration; where Congress has not spoken to the
issue, the inherent foreign affairs powers located in the executive
branch suggest that agencies still should be presumed to have the
right to pursue their objectives through soft law, cabined in ways that
we will discuss; and, if Congress has expressly discouraged agencies
from soft law, those agencies should be especially leery of implementing such agreements. In determining which category an agency is acting under in a particular case, however—an issue that often turns
upon statutory interpretation—considerable deference should be
paid to the agency’s view of the matter. This is consistent with the way
in which, in foreign relations law, courts are typically generous to the
President in determining under which Youngstown category he is
operating.146
complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak
or listen as a representative of the nation,” and therefore he “must necessarily be most
competent to determine when, how, and upon what subjects [international] negotiation
may be urged” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
144
343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
145
See id.
146
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (“[I]t is doubtless the case that
executive action in any particular instance falls, not neatly in one of three [categories], but
rather at some point along a spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization
to explicit congressional prohibition. This is particularly true as respects cases such as the
one before us, involving responses to international crises the nature of which Congress can
hardly have been expected to anticipate in any detail.”). The Court then interpreted the
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A. Presidential Power over Foreign Affairs
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., Justice George
Sutherland famously described “the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations—a power which does not
require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress.”147 Although the
legitimacy and reach of this power has been contested,148 in practice
executive branch actors and the courts have relied on it in defending
aggressive uses of presidential power on matters that relate to foreign
affairs.149
In Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland went on to discuss the
President’s foreign affairs power in connection with diplomatic interactions with other nations, emphasizing that the President’s diplomatic sources, combined with the often “highly necessary” need for
secrecy, leave him better positioned than Congress to conduct international negotiations.150 Since Curtiss-Wright, however, this power has
also been used to justify the domestic implementation of some international agreements and foreign policy decisions made solely by the
executive branch. In the 1930s and 1940s, the Supreme Court relied
on the understanding of the President as the sole organ of foreign
affairs in holding that a sole executive agreement entered into by the
President that settled claims between actors in the United States and
the Soviet Union was domestically enforceable and preempted state
law.151 Indeed, the Court has said that the fact that “the President’s
control of foreign relations includes the settlement of claims is indisputable.”152 After World War II, the executive branch relied on its
relevant statutes generously to support a favorable Youngstown category for the President.
Id. at 677–80. But see Ingrid Wuerth, Medellı́n: The New, New Formalism?, 13 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2009) (observing that in its 2008 decision in Medellı́n v. Texas, the Supreme
Court applied Justice Jackson’s framework unfavorably against the President when it concluded that his efforts to enforce a non-self-executing treaty fell under Youngstown category
three).
147
299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). Justice George Sutherland borrowed the term “sole organ” from a speech by John Marshall in the House of Representatives in 1800, see id. at 319,
and it reflects a concept with roots in both international and constitutional law. See Jean
Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers, 99 VA. L. REV. 987,
1012–15, 1029 (2013).
148
Harold Koh, for example, has criticized Curtiss-Wright and remarked that “[a]mong
government attorneys, Justice Sutherland’s lavish description of the president’s powers is
so often cited that it has come to be known as the ‘Curtiss-Wright, so I’m right’ cite.”
HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRANCONTRA AFFAIR 94 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).
149
See Galbraith, supra note 147, at 1014–15, 1018.
150
299 U.S. at 320–24 (citing historical sources for this proposition).
151
See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937).
152
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (quoting Pink, 315 U.S. at
240 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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sole organ power to enter into the “provisional” General Trade and
Tariff Agreement (GATT).153 Despite never receiving a clear endorsement from Congress or the Senate, the GATT was implemented in the
United States in ways that preempted contrary state law until its replacement by the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement in
the 1990s.154 As these examples suggest, the sole organ power has
helped enable the President to implement some hard international
law agreements in U.S. law under his own authority. There is necessarily an upper limit on this power—a point at which approval from the
Senate or Congress will be necessary for such presidential implementation—but it is unclear where exactly this limit lies.155
Although the President’s foreign affairs powers are often discussed in the context of hard international law agreements, this is not
a prerequisite. In American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, for example,
the Supreme Court held that a California law regarding insurance policy disclosures was preempted by the President’s foreign affairs powers
even though no hard international agreement signaled the intent to
preempt such laws.156 Indeed, some of the important agreements of
the twentieth century made under the President’s foreign affairs powers have been nonbinding soft law agreements.157 The President’s
foreign affairs powers thus authorize him to make soft law.
It is this theory that forms the basis for our view that a particular
sort of deference to the foreign affairs work of agencies is warranted;
that deference builds on the idea that the executive branch, through
the President’s constitutional powers, must have a relatively untrammeled role to play in international affairs. Like other parts of the
Constitution that have evolved and broadened from narrow original
153
See Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Act: Hearings on H.R. 1211 Before the S. Comm. on
Fin., 81st Cong. 1051 (1949).
154
See Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 751–57 (1998) (describing the Executive’s use of the “provisional” GATT until it was replaced by the 1994 agreement which established the WTO).
155
In Youngstown, the Supreme Court concluded that the President’s foreign affairs
powers did not authorize him to seize domestic steel mills despite a proclaimed need based
on the President’s decision to engage in the Korean War. 343 U.S. 579, 587–88 (1952); see
also id. at 645–46 (Jackson, J., concurring) (drawing a distinction between what the
President can do “when turned against the outside world for the security of our society”
and what he can do “inward” even where the inward acts are “important or even essential
for the military and naval establishment”); Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 530–32 (2008)
(holding that the President’s foreign affairs powers do not enable him to preempt state
criminal law in order to enforce an international law obligation of the United States under
a non-self-executing treaty).
156
539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003) (finding a “consistent Presidential foreign policy” to “encourage European governments and companies to volunteer settlement funds in preference to litigation or coercive sanctions” even though no sole executive agreement or
specific executive branch representations prohibited the content of the California law at
issue).
157
See examples supra note 64.
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grants, we think it is reasonable to impute the basis for foreign affairs
deference to not just the President, but to the representatives of the
executive branch who make it possible for the United States to speak
with a consistent voice in all of the specific issue areas where soft law
plays a role. In other words, we suggest that executive branch
regulators engaged in soft law should similarly be understood to partake of the President’s foreign affairs powers—and thus to have a
source of authority for going beyond their statutory mandates in international negotiation.
Foreign relations law rarely grapples directly with the question of
the extent to which President’s powers extend to the executive branch
more generally.158 In administrative law, however, unitary executive
theory helps explain the connections between the President and executive branch agencies. This theory finds its roots in Article II of the
U.S. Constitution, which states that “[t]he executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America.”159 The fact
that the framers of the Constitution chose to assign this power to one
individual rather than accepting a proposal to allocate it to members
of an executive council, proponents say, should be interpreted as giving the President authority over all executive branch officers.160
Moreover, unitary theorist adherents argue that the “Take Care”
clause within Article II mandates that the President himself is charged
with deploying enumerated powers granted by the Constitution.161
Academic literature discussing the unitary executive theory in relation
to administrative agencies generally speaks in terms of the President’s
authority to direct agency regulatory decisions162 and the President’s
authority to remove agency officials from office without cause.163
Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo have accordingly argued that
158
Cf. Henkin, supra note 42, 715 & n.8 (suggesting that scholars turn to “explore the
foreign affairs applications of . . . executive privilege and delegation of authority . . . especially within the executive branch” and urging that “there may be something still to be said
about legislative veto and presidential impoundment where foreign affairs are
concerned”).
159
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
160
See Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority over
Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2491 (2011).
161
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (stating that the executive must “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed”).
162
See Percival, supra note 160, at 2488.
163
The authority to remove agency officials without cause is the characteristic traditionally associated with an “executive,” as compared to an “independent,” administrative
agency. See generally Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and
Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1141–46 (2000) (discussing
the respective roles of the President and Congress in the removal of administrators who
perform “quasi-legislative” or “quasi-judicial,” as opposed to “purely executive,” functions);
Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies),
98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 775–76 (2013) (describing the traditionally conceived difference
between “independent” and “executive” administrative agencies—the presence of a
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“[t]he Constitution’s creation of a unitary executive eliminates conflicts in law enforcement and regulatory policy by ensuring that all of
the cabinet departments and agencies that make up the federal
government will execute the law in a consistent manner and in accordance with the president’s wishes.”164
The concept of a unitary executive branch is particularly natural
in the area of foreign policy, which the Supreme Court has described
as a “vast external realm, with . . . important, complicated, delicate
and manifold problems,” in which “the President alone has the power
to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.”165 We differ from
unitary-executive theorists, however, in attributing that power to agencies—even independent agencies like the Fed that are relatively free
of executive oversight. Indeed, while we see agencies pursuing a welter of soft law projects on their own initiative without necessarily evincing a great deal of direction from the White House itself, we suspect
that the complex, modern, globalized world admits of no alternative.
Understanding the President’s foreign affairs power to extend to
other executive branch actors is in many ways a straightforward move.
In practice a broad extension is already tolerated. No one thinks the
President can or should personally involve himself in all the foreign
policy work of the United States, and actors in the State Department
and the military are commonly taken to act for him in foreign affairs.
The same functionalist considerations that Justice Sutherland pointed
to in justifying the President’s foreign affairs powers apply to soft law
creation by regulatory agencies.166 The agencies are negotiating on
behalf of the United States in an international forum and their expertise makes them best positioned to accomplish these negotiations.
Moreover, the President has now personally endorsed international
regulatory cooperation in Executive Order 13,609, declaring that
“[i]n an increasingly global economy, international regulatory cooperation . . . can be an important means of promoting” regulatory goals,
including where national differences “might not be necessary” and
“[i]n meeting shared challenges.”167
“for-cause removal protection clause”—as specious and concluding that no “binary” distinction exists).
164
CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 44, at 3.
165
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
166
Indeed, we think it likely that administrative agencies can partake sufficiently of the
President’s sole-organ powers that they can negotiate at the international stage for positions that are in contradiction to their statutory mandates (although domestic implementation would await congressional approval). See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (“[T]he
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation . . . . Into
the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.”).
167
Exec. Order No. 13,609, supra note 2.
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In addition, as a practical matter, agencies’ interactions with their
international counterparts may raise the profile of their actions and
lead to greater supervision from the President and other executive
branch actors. Because soft law negotiations are also diplomatic negotiations, they may receive more initial attention within the executive
branch, such as triggering involvement from the State Department.168
Where international soft law fora cover issues relevant to multiple
agencies, as with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, agencies may need to engage more with each other than they ordinarily
would. At the Codex Alimentarius, for example, an important soft law
food organization, the FDA must collaborate with the Department of
Agriculture and USTR because both food safety and trade interests
are at issue.169 Particularly high-profile negotiations may even lead to
the personal involvement of the President, as was the case with the
soft law agreement on climate change negotiated at Copenhagen in
2010.170 Indeed, as in this case, lower-level executive branch actors
may sometimes need the President’s personal involvement in order to
get foreign nations to accept a soft law agreement.
The President’s foreign affairs powers, when leavened through
the rest of the administrative state, thus provide a doctrinal basis for
addressing some of the administrative law concerns with regard to soft
law agreements. They not only provide the executive branch with the
power to conduct soft law negotiations at the international level but
also can increase the power and flexibility of the executive branch
168
Jennifer Nou has proposed using a public-choice framework to understand how
agencies can help “self-insulate” themselves from review by the President by employing
strategies that increase the costs of this review. Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under
Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1760–61 (2013). Although she only discusses
purely domestic regulations, this framework may be helpful in thinking about
intra-executive branch dynamics in the soft law context. When agencies act internationally
in setting soft law, they may be less able to self-insulate because of the greater interagency
cooperation required in this process. Once a soft law agreement has been reached, however, the agencies may have greater power to self-insulate during its implementation because the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) and other executive branch
agencies may find it more costly to upset an agency policy that is embedded in an international consensus.
169
See Patti A. Goldman, Resolving the Trade and Environment Debate: In Search of a Neutral
Forum and Neutral Principles, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1279, 1288 (1992) (describing the
roles played by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and FDA with regard to public participation in the process); Lucinda Sikes, FDA’s Consideration of Codex Alimentarius Standards in
Light of International Trade Agreements, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 327, 328 (1998) (discussing
food safety interests in cases where Codex standards fall below the minimum required by
the FDA and U.S. Department of Agriculture).
170
That is, the Copenhagen Accord, Dec. 18, 2009, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the Conf. of the Parties on its 15th Sess., Dec. 7–19,
2009, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, at 4–7 (Mar. 30, 2010), available at http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf. For a discussion, see Hannah
Chang, International Executive Agreements on Climate Change, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 337
(2010).
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where domestic implementation is concerned. As an example of how
this can matter in the regulatory context, consider the proposed and
existing Keystone oil pipelines running from Canada to the United
States.171 The President’s foreign affairs powers give him the power to
require that such a transboundary project obtain a federal permit—
and thus effectively to require executive branch approval—even
though no statute of Congress requires it.172 Relying largely on the
sole-organ doctrine, two federal district courts have further held that
the State Department, acting on behalf of the President, can decide
whether or not to issue these transboundary permits without needing
to comply with the requirements of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA).173 As this example suggests, the President’s foreign affairs powers can increase the executive branch’s flexibility in
the context of transnational regulatory decisions.
B. Delegation Principles
Considering the foreign relations law dimensions of soft law
agreements adds flexibility to their implementation in a way that
reduces administrative law delegation concerns. This is because foreign relations law takes a looser approach to delegation than does administrative law in several important respects.
To begin with, foreign relations law is more tolerant than administrative law of delegations from Congress to the President. As the
Supreme Court has concluded, “Congress—in giving the Executive
authority over matters of foreign affairs—must of necessity paint with
171
For background on this project, see generally CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PROPOSED
KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE: LEGAL ISSUES (Jan. 20, 2012).
172
The original executive order requiring permits emphasized this foreign relations
perspective. Exec. Order No. 11,423, 3 C.F.R. § 441 (1970), 33 Fed. Reg. 11,741 (Aug. 20,
1968) (“[T]he proper conduct of the foreign relations of the United States requires that
executive permission be obtained for the construction and maintenance at the borders of
the United States of facilities connecting the United States with a foreign country.”); see
also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 171, at 4–6 (concluding that, as several district
courts have held, the President’s authority to require a permit rests in his foreign affairs
powers, including his Commander in Chief power).
173
Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 659 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1079–82
(D.S.D. 2009) (citing the sole-organ doctrine in concluding that no proper challenge lies
through the APA and NEPA because the permit is presidential rather than agency action);
NRDC v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 658 F. Supp. 2d 105, 112–13 (D.D.C. 2009) (reaching a similar conclusion). But see Sierra Club v. Clinton, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1156–57 (D. Minn.
2010) (concluding without any discussion of foreign relations law that NEPA applies via
the APA to the State Department’s permitting decision particularly given that it had in fact
prepared an environmental impact statement). In analyzing these various opinions, a report prepared by the Congressional Research Service suggested that the executive branch
could choose whether or not to make itself subject to NEPA based on whether or not it
chose to conduct a NEPA review, at least for cross-border projects. See CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., supra note 171, at 25–26.
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a brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic areas.”174
A long line of cases dating back at least to the Supreme Court’s 1892
decision in Field v. Clark175 recognizes this principle.176 The
importance of this distinction has dwindled since the Supreme Court
relaxed its approach to domestic delegations during the New Deal, yet
courts continue to draw upon it in upholding broad delegations to
the President in foreign relations law cases.177
This relaxed delegation standard can make it easier for courts to
accept agency implementation of soft law agreements under statutes
delegating broad authority to the agencies. Quite often, Congress empowers executive branch actors to seek international cooperation or
international agreements (without specifying whether these are to be
hard or soft) in particular subject areas while providing little guidance
on the content of these agreements.178 For example, Congress has
authorized the President to “conclude agreements . . . with other
countries” to control aspects of the drug trade,179 to have his intellectual property appointees “work[ ] with other countries to establish international standards and policies for the effective protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights,”180 and to have the Secretary of Health and Human Services “participate and otherwise cooperate in any international health or medical research or research
training meetings, conferences, or other activities.”181 A foreign relations law approach reduces the doctrinal delegation concerns with
these kinds of delegations. Of more practical importance, it also
reduces the risk that courts will narrowly construe these and other
statutes that agencies act under in implementing soft law agreements
174

Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
143 U.S. 649, 690 (1892) (“[Precedent shows] that, in the judgment of the legislative branch . . . it is often desirable, if not essential . . . to invest the President with large
discretion in matters arising out of the execution of statutes relating to trade and commerce with other nations.”).
176
See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp.
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 321–24 (1936).
177
Examples from the courts of appeal in recent years include United States v. Kuok,
671 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The ‘[d]elegation of foreign affairs authority is given
even broader deference than in the domestic arena.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431, 1438 (9th Cir. 1996))); United
States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 578–79 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Mindful of the heightened
deference accorded the Executive in this field [i.e., foreign affairs], we decline to interpret
the legislative grant of authority parsimoniously.”); and United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211,
215 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that foreign affairs is “a sphere in which delegation is afforded
even broader deference”).
178
See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the
Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 159–66 (2009) (listing a selection of thirty-six such authorizing
statutes in twenty different subject areas and observing that “many of the authorizations
provide relatively few specific substantive limits”).
179
22 U.S.C. § 2291(a)(2) (2012).
180
15 U.S.C. § 8113(a)(6) (2012).
181
22 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(4) (2012).
175
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in order to avoid delegation concerns, since the delegation concerns
are less in the first place.
Foreign relations law can also help ease concerns about delegations from the United States to international institutions in several
ways. First, the greater tolerance of delegations from Congress to the
executive branch in the foreign relations law context may justify a relaxing of the subdelegation doctrine: if Congress need not be as specific in its delegations of power, then presumably it also does not need
to be as specific about delegations of the delegations. Second, there is
reason to think that as a constitutional matter, delegations outside the
federal government may be less problematic where foreign affairs are
concerned.182 The United States participates in a number of international organizations in ways that could be said to raise delegation concerns under the domestic constitutional principles applicable in the
ordinary administrative law context.183 Although some commentators
have raised these concerns, others have disputed them,184 and the
United States is building up an impressive amount of historical practice to support the more relaxed position.
Perhaps even more importantly, taking into account the foreign
relations law dimensions of soft law agreements permits a functional
compromise on the constitutional question of delegation of decisionmaking authority to international organizations. This compromise is
to accept that the domestic agencies may almost always follow the international consensus which they have helped to develop but nonetheless to find the delegation problem soothed by the fact that
domestic law does not legally obligate the agencies to implement this
consensus. This is the approach that the D.C. Circuit ultimately embraced in relation to hard law in the Montreal Protocol case discussed
182
In the foreign affairs context, such delegations go at least back to the Jay Treaty of
1796, which provided for a mixed arbitration tribunal. Opponents of the treaty unsuccessfully protested this provision as an unconstitutional delegation. See David Golove, The New
Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1697, 1745–46 (2003).
183
See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 29, at 1578–82, 1594 (giving various examples, including the Chemical Weapons Convention, which relies on verification through the use of
international inspectors who are by design unaccountable to domestic governments);
Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492,
1495, 1516–17 (2004) (describing the “inexorable” growth of international delegations
and giving the example of a U.N. Security Council Resolution compelling all nations to
take specific actions against the financing of terrorist activities); see also Barbara
Koremenos, When, What, and Why Do States Choose to Delegate?, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
151, 159–60 (2008) (finding based on a random sample of treaties filed with the U.N. that
more than half of the international agreements call for some form of foreign delegation).
184
For those raising concerns, see, e.g., Bradley, supra note 29; Ku, supra note 29. For
those rebutting concerns, see, e.g., Kristina Daugirdas, International Delegations and Administrative Law, 66 MD. L. REV. 707 (2007); Golove, supra note 182. For more intermediate
views, see Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of Administrative
Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 201–08 (2011); Swaine, supra note 183.
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in Part II. The court concluded that the delegation problem there
was avoided by construing the statute in question to give the executive
branch the option of choosing to implement the international consensus, reasoning that “[t]he Executive has the power to implement
ongoing collective endeavors with other countries.”185 By framing the
executive branch’s ultimate decision as optional and nodding to the
value that the executive branch gains from coordination with other
countries, the court suggested that a formalist, easy-to-satisfy understanding of the nondelegation doctrine could be applied in the soft
law context.
C. Deference to the Executive Branch
Courts tend to give special deference to the views of the executive
branch where foreign relations law is implicated. Typically grounded
in functionalist justifications, this deference can occur with regard to
treaty interpretation, to factual determinations, to presidential policy
judgments, and to the interpretation of statutes dealing with foreign
affairs or implicating foreign affairs.186 To be sure, this deference is
not always present and courts can be unpredictable in their use of it.
In a recent, nuanced account of the issue, Ingrid Wuerth has described the Supreme Court’s approach to foreign affairs deference as
a “doctrinal mess” and suggested that the Supreme Court is increasingly wary of it in many contexts.187 But the concept persists, and
lower courts in particular frequently apply foreign affairs deference
both in justiciability determinations and in evaluating the merits of
various claims.188
Emphasizing the foreign relations dimensions of soft law agreements could increase the scope available to the executive branch in its
statutory interpretation and the deference that courts extend it in litigation. Executive branch actors implementing statutory schemes already typically receive some deference under administrative law
principles, such as Chevron deference for notice-and-comment
rulemaking, Auer deference for an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulations, and arbitrary-and-capricious review under the APA for
185
NRDC v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Curtis Bradley has proposed a more
stringent position, arguing that decisions of international organizations which the United
States belongs to under treaties should be understood as non-self-executing and should
require congressional implementation. Bradley, supra note 29, at 1587–95.
186
See BRADLEY, supra note 25, at 19–21.
187
Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the
Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601, 613–14 (2013).
188
See Daniel Abebe & Eric A. Posner, The Flaws of Foreign Affairs Legalism, 51 VA. J.
INT’L L. 507, 509–10 (2011) (describing the “avoidance doctrines” that courts have developed to limit their own capacity to adjudicate foreign affairs issues and citing examples of
judicial deference to executive determinations on such issues).
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various forms of agency action.189 Foreign relations law principles can
boost these levels of deference, sometimes by increasing the formal
level of deference at issue190 and sometimes by providing courts with a
basis for being particularly generous in how they apply the relevant
level of administrative deference.
By way of example, in a recent case involving the power of the
Secretary of State to issue regulations preempting a New York property tax on residences of foreign diplomats, Judge Guido Calabresi
observed for the Second Circuit that:
When Congress expressly confers to an agency interpretive authority over a statute that the agency is administering, our review of
the agency’s interpretation is limited and deferential. . . . Our deference is especially substantial with respect to the State
Department’s administration of its delegated responsibilities under
the [Act at issue] because the Act deals with an area “bound up with
security concerns and issues of reciprocity among nations.”191

This extra boost to deference can widen the functional scope of a
statutory mandate. Agency action in the soft law context typically
deals with “issues of reciprocity among nations” and thus provides
leeway for particularly wide interpretation of congressional statutes,
especially those signaling support for cooperative international approaches.192 Although this additional scope will appear only on the
margins and will often be hard to isolate, it suggests that agencies will
189
See, e.g., Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452, 462–63 (1997); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a). Indeed, there is a literature looking at how
administrative deference and foreign affairs deference connect up. See Eric A. Posner &
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170 (2007); Curtis A.
Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649 (2000).
190
Jensen v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 512 F.2d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 1975) (“Since
presidential action in the field of foreign affairs is committed to presidential discretion by
law, it follows that the APA does not apply to the action of the Secretary in approving the
regulations here challenged.” (citations omitted)); Dist. No. 1 v. Mar. Admin., 215 F.3d 37,
41–42 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting an APA claim to federal approval of a shipping transfer
on the grounds that a decision driven by “national defense, the adequacy of the merchant
marine, foreign policy, and the national interest” was a matter committed to agency discretion by law).
191
City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 618 F.3d
172, 181 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted); see also id. at 189 (describing the delegation of
authority as “exceptionally broad” and noting the foreign affairs dimensions in deferring
to the State Department’s interpretation of the preemptive scope of the statute); see also
INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988) (concluding that because “INS officials must exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations . . .
therefore the reasons for giving deference to agency decisions on petitions for reopening
or reconsideration in other administrative contexts apply with even greater force in the
INS context”); Paradissiotis v. Rubin, 171 F.3d 983, 988 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding in a
case about financial sanctions related to Libya that “[i]n matters like this, which involve
foreign policy and national security, we are particularly obliged to defer to the discretion
of executive agencies interpreting their governing law and regulations”).
192
Permanent Mission of India, 618 F.3d at 181.
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benefit from framing the implementation of soft law agreements as
actions with foreign relations dimensions.
D. Reduced Procedural Obligations
Foreign relations law may also bring flexibility to the procedural
requirements of administrative law where soft law implementation is
concerned. This helps get around the awkward fit between
notice-and-comment rulemaking, with its presumption of a discrete
decision-making body, and the realities of international regulatory cooperation, which can require domestic flexibility prior to the negotiations and consistency after them. It also may ameliorate some
procedural due process concerns.
Doctrinally, the foreign affairs cast to soft law implementation
may make the notice-and-comment procedures of the APA inapplicable in certain circumstances. For one thing, these APA procedures
may not apply at all where the agency is understood to be exercising
power delegated from the President, since the President is not an
“agency” within the meaning of the APA. The recent case of Ancient
Coin Collectors Guild v. United States Customs & Border Protection illustrates this principle.193 A congressional statute authorizes the
President to impose import limitations on cultural property where he
has entered into agreements with other countries to do so.194 Pursuant to an agreement with Cyprus, the State Department issued a
rulemaking barring the importation of certain coins.195 When coin
collectors sued, claiming a violation of the APA’s notice-and-comment
procedures, the federal district court held that the APA did not apply
because “the State Department . . . [was] acting on behalf of the
President,” reasoning that this “conclusion is particularly justified
here, because the Department . . . act[ed] in the realm of foreign
affairs.”196
Moreover, the APA’s notice-and-comment provisions do not apply to “a military or foreign affairs function of the United States.”197
This foreign affairs function exception could conceivably be used to
exempt at least some regulations based on soft law agreements from
193

801 F. Supp. 2d 383 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 698 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2012).
19 U.S.C. § 2602 (2012).
195
See Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 392.
196
Id. at 403; see also id. at 404 (noting that decision making about what countries to
reach agreements with “will involve a variety of considerations beyond those set out in [the
statute]” and observing that “Congress likely concluded that deference to the President
was appropriate given the foreign policy considerations inherent in deciding whether to
impose import restrictions”). On appeal, the Fourth Circuit did not reach this issue, but it
signaled the importance of deference to the executive branch in light of the foreign affairs
nature of the issue. See Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, 698 F.3d at 183–84 (4th Cir. 2012).
197
5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2012).
194
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traditional notice and comment. The inclusion of this exception was
probably motivated by congressional concerns about the need for secrecy in military and foreign affairs.198 But the language reaches
farther and has been applied more broadly, including where a “rule
does no more than carry out obligations to a foreign nation undertaken for purposes of resolving a problem requiring coordination.”199
Courts have found the foreign affairs function exception applicable in
contexts as wide-ranging as Federal Highway Administration regulations implementing transnational trucker-licensing agreements,200
FCC regulations implementing international agreements on broadcasting power,201 State Department regulations on benefits to foreign
missions and consular offices,202 and immigration regulations where
“public rulemaking provisions should provoke definitely undesirable
international consequences.”203 Of course, not every soft law agreement can justify discarding the notice-and-comment process, but the
foreign affairs function exception provides a statutory basis for flexibility in at least some circumstances. Even if this exception does not
apply, we think judges could appropriately take into account the foreign affairs context of soft-law-based rulemaking in determining how
stringently to apply the APA’s procedural requirements.
In suggesting that the foreign relations law nature of soft law
agreements can justify more procedural flexibility in rulemakings implementing these agreements, we do not mean that secrecy and lack
of public notice are always necessary or wise. Our claim is simply that
the current system of notice-and-comment rulemaking is designed for
198
See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 79-248, at 12 (1946) (discussing “foreign affairs functions” in
terms of whether they “requir[e] secrecy in the public interest”). The Attorney General’s
Manual on the APA suggests that while this exception does not apply to everything extending beyond the borders of the United States, it is implicated where relations with other
states are affected, and that it is not limited to merely diplomatic functions. See U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 26–27
(1947). The Administrative Conference of the United States has long recommended eliminating this exception, but it would retain an exception where specific foreign affairs
secrecy interests are at stake. It emphasizes that the APA’s general exception for situations
where notice-and-comment is “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest,” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2012), would continue to apply as well to foreign affairs
issues. See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 73–5: ELIMINATION OF THE
“MILITARY OR FOREIGN AFFAIRS FUNCTION” EXEMPTION FROM APA RULEMAKING REQUIREMENTS (adopted Dec. 18, 1973), available at http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/73-5.pdf. This exception might also apply with regard to some soft law agreements, but we do not analyze that issue here.
199
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Pena, 17 F.3d 1478, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
200
See id. It is unclear whether the agreement with Mexico that gave rise to this was a
soft law obligation or a hard one.
201
WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601, 616 (2d Cir. 1968).
202
City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 618 F.3d
172, 201 (2d Cir. 2010).
203
Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 744 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Yassini v. Crosland, 618
F.2d 1356, 1360 n.4 (9th Cir. 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN403.txt

2014]

unknown

Seq: 43

6-MAY-14

SOFT LAW AS FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

11:36

777

executive branch decision making on purely domestic issues and
works less well where the global nature of problems makes international cooperation important. In the absence of a congressional fix
aimed at directly dealing with this tension,204 the foreign affairs function exception can authorize agencies to forego the ill-fitting
processes and instead design ones more fitting to the circumstances of
global regulatory cooperation.
Finally, we note that a foreign relations perspective may also ease
procedural due process issues that arise in relation to particularized
soft law decision making. The traditional balancing test for procedural due process includes consideration of the government interests at
stake and the burdens that greater process would create for the government.205 To the extent that international cooperation implicates
the government interests and burdens at stake, a court could consider
this in the appropriate case. In addition, to the extent that claims of
United States citizens against foreign countries are concerned, historical practice in foreign relations law provides strong support for executive branch action that settles these claims “‘without [the citizens’]
consent, or even without consultation with them, usually without exclusive regard for their interests, as distinguished from those of the
nation as a whole.”206
IV
DEFENDING SOFT LAW INSTITUTIONS WITH FOREIGN
RELATIONS DOCTRINES
Our approach to justifying international regulatory cooperation
can make a difference in a number of areas at the cutting edge of
globalization. In this Part, we illustrate how our approach could apply
to five very different issues: conflict diamonds, the Internet, financial
regulation, sports arbitration, and climate change. These topics showcase the diversity of present and potential international regulatory cooperation.207 Some are discrete and some are broad; some have welldeveloped practices already in place and others represent only future
204
See Zaring, supra note 30 (calling for an International Administrative Procedure Act
to address these issues).
205
See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529–32 (2004) (plurality opinion) (discussing the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), in the context of a national security issue).
206
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680 (1981) (quoting LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 262–63 (1972)).
207
Many other areas of soft law constitute new sources of obligation for American
rulemakers—obligations that those regulators are taking seriously. Even the conduct of
war, seemingly the most sovereign of sovereign powers, is not immune from the adoption
of soft law. To give one example, the United States has committed to informal norms of
detainee treatment through the so-called Copenhagen Principles. For a discussion of
these principles, see Jacques Hartmann, The Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines,

R
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possibilities; some involve soft law institutions that have developed
their own mechanisms of international public participation, while
others are less transparent; and some have been crafted entirely or
primarily by the executive branch, while others involve congressional
statutes that directly help or hinder international cooperation. As we
discuss below, these differences affect the extent to which bringing
foreign relations law principles to bear can increase the flexibility
available to the executive branch in forming and implementing soft
law agreements.208
A. Conflict Diamonds and Delegations
The United States has joined a multinational effort to restrict trafficking in conflict diamonds—a worthy commitment but one that
shows how participation in a soft law organization is furthered by foreign relations law principles related to the nondelegation doctrine
and the procedural exemptions that we think should be applied to
soft law processes.209
Limiting reliance on so-called conflict minerals has become an
important part of America’s relationship with the developing world.
Among other actions, the United States has joined an international
soft law agreement, known as the Kimberley Process, aimed at
preventing conflict diamonds from crossing borders.210 As Lesley
Wexler has observed, this scheme was devised by nothing more than
“a coalition of states, NGOs, and corporations interested in the diamond trade.”211 John Ruggie views this form of organization as a plus.
“Soft law hybrid arrangements like the Kimberley Process,” in his view,
“represent an important innovation by embodying such a concept:
combining importing and exporting states, companies, and civil
EJIL: TALK! (Nov. 3, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-copenhagen-process-principlesand-guidelines/.
208
In exploring these different issues, we do not judge the substance of the soft law
described. Our goal is to consider the executive branch’s power to make and implement
these commitments, not to evaluate the underlying merits of the commitments themselves.
209
There have been recent challenges by the National Association of Manufacturers,
the Chamber of Commerce, and the Business Roundtable to the conflict-minerals rule
under Dodd-Frank. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13-cv-635 (RLW), 2013 WL 3803918
(D.D.C. July 23, 2013) (challenging the SEC rulemaking under the APA and the final
rule’s disclosure requirements as compelling speech in violation of the First Amendment).
210
See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 5, 2002), http://
www.state.gov/e/eb/diamonds/c19974.htm. The Kimberley Process, which is described in
the Certification Scheme, is essentially a working group that supervises the Certification
Scheme at the international level. See id. Another step taken by the United States in regard to conflict minerals is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act’s requirement that
publicly traded companies report on their use of conflict minerals from the Democratic
Republic of Congo and adjoining countries. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012).
211
Lesley Wexler, Regulating Resource Curses: Institutional Design and Evolution of the Blood
Diamond Regime, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1717, 1729–30 (2010).
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society actors, as well as integrating voluntary with mandatory
elements.”212
Unusually for a soft law agreement, for the conflict-diamond
agreement Congress has passed specific legislation authorizing and directing the implementation process in the United States. The 2003
Clean Diamond Trade Act (CDTA) spells out a multitude of interactions between soft law, hard law, congressional statutes, and executive
action.213 It directs the President to “prohibit the importation into, or
exportation from, the United States of any rough diamond, from
whatever source, that has not been controlled through the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme.”214 The seeming clarity of this directive
is modified, however, in several ways. First, the CDTA is only effective
if the President has certified to Congress that it does not conflict with
certain hard international law obligations of the United States, which
in turn depend upon steps taken by the WTO or the U.N. Security
Council.215 Second, the CDTA contains a further grant of authority to
the President to waive this prohibition for any country for up to a year
if, among other things, “the President determines that the waiver is in
the national interests of the United States.”216 Other sections provide
that “[t]he President is authorized to and shall as necessary issue such
proclamations, regulations, licenses, and orders, and conduct such investigations, as may be necessary to carry out this chapter” and may
delegate these duties as appropriate.217 Individuals who violate the
CDTA and its regulations are subject to civil and criminal penalties.218
While the specific congressional authorization of the Kimberley
Process powerfully legitimizes its domestic implementation, from an
administrative law standpoint it poses other problems. Most significantly, the statute and its implementation raise two delegation concerns. First, the trigger based on U.N. or WTO action is an
international trigger foreign to administrative law—one that raised
such substantial constitutional concerns that President George W.
Bush declared his intent to construe this trigger as discretionary
212
John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda,
101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819, 839 (2007).
213
Clean Diamond Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3901–3913 (2012).
214
Id. § 3903(a). For a judicial discussion of the statute, see United States v. Approximately 1,170 Carats of Rough Diamonds Seized at John F. Kennedy Int’l Airport on January 13, 2004, No. 05-CV-5816 (ARR)(MDG), 2008 WL 2884387 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2008).
For a scholarly critique, see Edward R. Fluet, Note, Conflict Diamonds: U.S. Responsibility and
Response, 7 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 103, 115 (2005) (arguing that the statute will fail to be
effective absent an increase in inspections and oversight).
215
See Clean Diamond Trade Act, Pub. L. 108-19, § 15, 117 Stat. 631, 637 (2003)
(uncodified section).
216
19 U.S.C. § 3903(b)(2) (further providing that the President must report any waivers and the reasons for them to congressional committees).
217
Id. §§ 3904(a), 3913.
218
Id. § 3907.
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rather than mandatory.219 Second, the CDTA gives the President
broad discretionary powers, including the ability to determine waivers
in the “national interest” and arguably the ability to terminate it at his
discretion—a broad delegation indeed.220
A foreign relations law perspective provides a new frame for analyzing these delegation issues. As to the trigger, a foreign relations law
perspective offers reason to think that it is constitutional, although
there is room for debate on the issue. As mentioned above, practice
and some commentators accept more delegations in the international
context than the domestic one.221 Furthermore, foreign relations law
offers a backdrop of practice for analyzing termination questions. In
some sense, every treaty is potentially a delegation of termination
power to a foreign actor.222 As to the broad discretion vested by the
statute in the President, this seems unproblematic from a foreign relations law perspective. The authority for the President to waive the
statute’s application in the “national interest” seems appropriate
under the lessened standard for delegation set forth in Curtiss-Wright
and other Supreme Court cases. Indeed, the authority to terminate
the statute’s application more generally also seems appropriate; it is
not inconsistent with other statutes that authorize the President to
take unilateral action in trade disputes or the like.
Approaching the statute from a foreign relations law perspective
builds in further flexibility for the executive branch in several respects. First, the President’s foreign affairs powers give executive
branch officials the ability to continue coordination with other nations under the Kimberley Process without undue concern about the
extent to which the statute authorizes this.223 Second, this approach
can justify deviations from ordinary APA procedures. The option is
arguably available—although the rulemakers do not seem to have
219

See Swaine, supra note 183, at 1519–20 & n.100.
See Fluet, supra note 214, at 116.
221
See supra Part III.B.
222
Treaties are the “supreme law of the land” under the Supremacy Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. VI, yet, because they are contracts, they can be terminated under certain circumstances by the actions of other states. Congressional statutes can also potentially be
terminated in similar ways. See An Act for Giving Effect to Certain Treaty Stipulations
Between This and Foreign Governments, for the Apprehension and Delivering Up of Certain Offenders, 9 Stat. 302, 303 (1848) (providing that this statute was to “continue in force
during the existence of any treaty of extradition with any foreign government, and no
longer”).
223
The CDTA expresses the “sense of Congress” that the Kimberley Process is “ongoing” and that the President should work with it to adopt measures to track statistics and to
monitor the Process’s effectiveness in controlling the diamond trade. 19 U.S.C. § 3909; see
also id. §§ 3906, 3908 (expressing congressional support for presidential support and technical assistance for the adoption and implementation of the Kimberley Process by other
countries). In light of the President’s foreign relations powers, executive-branch officials
involved in the Kimberley Process could undertake other forms of international engagement if necessary.
220
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exercised it—to interpret the CDTA as a delegation to the President
rather than to administrative agencies and therefore to find the APA
to be generally inapplicable.224 Moreover, regulations enforcing this
statute are good candidates for the foreign affairs function exception
to notice-and-comment rulemaking. There is intriguing variation in
the extent to which agencies have applied this exception or instead
followed the rote paths of the APA process. The Department of the
Treasury has tended to invoke this exception on CDTA regulations,225
while other agencies have not done so or have taken a mixed
approach.226
B. The Internet and Delegations to a Firm and a Regulatory
Network
The government has, in an effort to smooth the concerns of
other countries about American domination of cyberspace, delegated
much of its power over cyberspace’s architecture to a private corporation supervised by a council of regulators from over fifty countries.
The effort has been accused by a respected American scholar of violating the nondelegation doctrine, and subdelegation claims might be
made about the Department of Commerce’s decision to share its supervisory role with a regulatory council of agencies from across the
world. But a foreign relations perspective makes the American decision to retreat from dominance over the architecture of cyberspace
appear to be a sensible exercise of the government’s foreign affairs
powers.
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), sets the ground rules for domain names on the Internet,
which in turn makes it an important component of the Internet’s architecture, which in turn makes it a subject of consistent interest
among IP scholars.227 ICANN began as an American corporation supervised by the Department of Commerce; now it is supervised by the
Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC), composed of a variety of
224
See supra Part III.D (discussing how some district courts have applied similar
reasoning).
225
See, e.g., 73 Fed. Reg. 29,433, 29,433 (May 21, 2008); 69 Fed. Reg. 56,936, 56,937
(Sept. 23, 2004); see also 68 Fed. Reg. 45,777, 45,778 (Aug. 4, 2003) (invoking the exception but nonetheless making the rule interim to allow an opportunity for comments).
226
The one time the Treasury Department joined with the Department of Homeland
Security in a CDTA rulemaking, they did not invoke this exception. See 77 Fed. Reg.
48,918, 48,918 (Aug. 15, 2012). The Census Bureau has varied its approach. Compare 70
Fed. Reg. 2072, 2072–73 (Jan. 12, 2005) (notice of proposed rulemaking without mentioning the exception), with 68 Fed. Reg. 59,877, 59,878 (Oct. 20, 2003) (final rule invoking
the exception).
227
The quintessential commitment to this sort of focus comes from LAWRENCE LESSIG,
CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). For a discussion, see David G. Post, What
Larry Doesn’t Get: Code, Law, and Liberty in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1439 (2000).
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national regulators. The members of the GAC to provide input into
its particularly hot-button issues, such as whether create an .xxx domain or whether some domain names ought to be barred for public
safety reasons.228 Here too, American perspectives are mediated by
those of the rest of the world.229 The GAC itself reports that it “is
regularly attended by approximately 50 national governments, distinct
economies, and global organisations such as the ITU, UNESCO, the
World Intellectual Property Organisation . . . , INTERPOL and regional organisations such as the OECD, Asia Pacific Forum, and
Council of Europe.”230
In administrative law, the delegation of the authority to design
and oversee the architecture of something as important as the
Internet to a private corporation, in consultation with a committee on
which the United States putatively has less than one-fiftieth of a voice,
seems like the informal ceding of an important government function
in ways that might raise constitutional concerns—all the more so,
given that before, the Department of Commerce had exclusive regulatory authority over ICANN. Michael Froomkin has argued that “if
ICANN is, in fact, independent, then the federal government’s decision to have ICANN manage a resource of such importance and to
allow—indeed, require—it to enforce regulatory conditions on users
of that resource violates the nondelegation doctrine of the U.S.
Constitution.”231 Moreover, the D.C. Circuit has recently been per-

228
See Governmental Advisory Committee, GOVERNMENTAL ADVISORY COMM., https://
gacweb.icann.org/display/gacweb/Governmental+Advisory+Committee (last visited Mar.
13, 2014).
229
See Paul J. Cambria, Jr., ICANN, the “.xxx” Debate, and Antitrust: The Adult Internet
Industry’s Next Challenge, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 101, 104 (2012) (discussing how the
ICANN Board sought and subsequently disregarded guidance from the GAC and through
public comment before approving the “.xxx” top-level domain); Jonathan Weinberg, Governments, Privatization, and “Privatization”: ICANN and the GAC, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 189, 203 (2011) (“After further rounds of debate, with the GAC weighing in
at all stages, ICANN ended up withdrawing its approval.”).
230
About the GAC, GOVERNMENTAL ADVISORY COMM., https://gacweb.icann.org/
display/gacweb/About+The+GAC (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
231
A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the
APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 20 (2000). Delegation challenges have not been
made yet, but there has been acceptance that the Department of Commerce has ceded its
control to ICANN. See Bord v. Banco de Chile, 205 F. Supp. 2d 521 (E.D. Va. 2002) (affirming ICANN’s role in domain names); Island Online, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc.,
119 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (same). Nonetheless, the prospect of special influence by the Department of Commerce remains murky. See ICM Registry, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t
of Commerce, 538 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D.D.C. 2008) (suggesting that the Department has
little control over ICANN decisionmaking); see also COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, DEFENDING AN OPEN, GLOBAL, SECURE, AND RESILIENT INTERNET 25 (2013) (“Many states are
already skeptical of ICANN’s autonomy from U.S. government control, given its history
and the Commerce Department’s contract with ICANN.”).
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suaded by these sorts of concerns regarding delegations to private
entities.232
But other observers like the way that the existence of ICANN
keeps the government away from the First Amendment implications
of creating domain names on the Internet and harnesses the power of
the private sector to efficiently distribute the resources identification
offers to the Internet.233 And some are glad that the GAC mediates
what might otherwise be American dominance of the granting of
Internet rights.234
In evaluating the legality of the delegation to ICANN, we think it
would be appropriate to draw from foreign relations law principles as
well as administrative law ones. The involvement of the soft law GAC
signals that foreign policy interests underlie in part the U.S. government’s decision to pass the baton. It is understood that the executive
may wish to trade independent authority for the international stability
promised by global institutions, or that a willingness to divest America
of its power in certain areas, such as Internet architecture, may enhance its reputation.235 The foreign policy strands of ICANN and its
actions are demonstrated by continued State Department concerns
about ICANN’s decisions and its ability to remain the dominant actor
on domain names236 and by appreciation from abroad that the GAC
mediates what might otherwise be American dominance of the granting of Internet rights.237 Once we approach ICANN from the perspective of foreign relations delegations—unlike taking the ordinary
232
Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 671 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
There are also some antitrust concerns over ICANN’s administration of the domain names.
See Coalition for ICANN Transparency, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 611 F.3d 495 (9th Cir. 2010)
(challenging the agreement between VeriSign and ICANN under which Verisign is paid
for registering domain names).
233
See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, Matching Public Ends and Private Means: Insights from the
New Institutional Economics, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 43, 44 (2002) (arguing that
recent history “confirms the potential of private groups, such as ICANN, to serve governmental interests”). It might also underscore the public nature of ICANN. See Brentwood
Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 298 (2001) (concluding that a
state athletic association was a state actor because a state agency—the state’s education
department—was sufficiently entwined with the actions of the association).
234
See, e.g., Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the
Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369, 406 (2005) (expressing concern about American dominance in the area).
235
See, e.g., Swaine, supra note 183, at 1562 (“[C]redibility is a more pervasive issue in
negotiating the terms of international institutions, where nations have a plainer interest in
inhibiting defection in order to promote stable, collaborative investment in the regime.”);
id. at 1591–92 (employing this rationale to explain some of “the more unlikely delegations
(like those to the UN and WTO) that appear to have most compromised U.S.
sovereignty”).
236
See ICM Registry, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 134; see also COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
supra note 231 (emphasizing that U.S. government actions in relation to ICANN “reverberate abroad”).
237
See Krisch, supra note 234.
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administrative law approach that the D.C. Circuit has used to skeptically police delegations—then there is a potentially stronger footing
for this sort of delegation in light of lessened concern for delegations
in the foreign relations law context.238
C. Financial Regulation and Deference Where Congress Has
Spoken
Financial regulation represents the apogee of commitment to soft
law, and we briefly discuss it here for two reasons. First, its importance—a subject one of us has discussed in more detail in a series of
other articles239—illustrates just how essential our foreign relations
frame for soft law could be; an entire sphere of regulation depends
entirely upon it. Second, recent developments in financial regulation—specifically parts of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act
passed in the wake of the financial crisis—offers an illustration of a
way to rein in American regulators from collaborating with their foreign counterparts in unwelcome ways, even under our deferential
approach.
Congress has broadly blessed international cooperation in finance, making the nondelegation questions rather easy. However, it
has required financial regulators to diverge from the international approach to financial stability in a few ways; in such a case, we think it
clear that regulators should not look to the foreign affairs power to
permit them to ignore congressional commands.
But first, the context. The entire burgeoning field of international financial regulation is governed by soft-governance standards,
with no prospect of a treaty in sight and very little appetite for one by
the regulators and participants in developed financial markets.240 Up
to now, the Treasury Department and other U.S. agencies involved in
international financial regulation have wholeheartedly embraced
global standard setting and, perhaps relatedly, have exhibited a
238
See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(holding a delegation to a private corporation and mediation process to be unconstitutional); NRDC v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (questioning the resort to international environmental standards as a potentially unconstitutional delegation).
239
See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 81, at 686 (asserting that the international financial
regulatory process is “likely to be a foremost achievement of international cooperation in
the twenty-first century”).
240
See CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 3 (2012) (“[G]lobal rules and standards [in international financial law]
are promulgated as informal, nonbinding ‘soft law’ agreements, often between regulatory
agencies—and by international institutions with amorphous legal identities.”); PierreHugues Verdier, The Political Economy of International Financial Regulation, 88 IND. L.J. 1405,
1405 (2013) (“In sharp contrast with other international regimes . . . , [international financial regulation] relies not on treaties and formal international organizations but on ‘soft
law’ standards designed by informal networks of national regulators . . . .”).
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willingness to take the bedrock requirements of administrative law
with a large grain of salt.241
In the wake of the financial crisis, however, these tensions have
increased in ways that foreign relations law principles can partially—
but only partially—help smooth.
The problem is not the policy, but is the process, specifically the
process by which American regulators have committed themselves to a
minimum set of capital adequacy standards.242 Basel III, the
post–financial crisis iteration of the rules on the amount of money
banks must hold on hand as safety cushions against panics or unexpected losses, was devised by global negotiation among domestic bank
regulators.243 The result is a set of rules that are legislative in nature
and regulate the future conduct of financial institutions—in the
United States, such rules would have to go through notice and comment.244 But these rules only do so very late in the process of their
provenance; once the Basel Committee has agreed on them, its
American members must implement them.245 But rules, at least in
241
See Zaring, supra note 30, at 66; see also id. at 89 (describing how this
“not-so-punctilious observance” results in informal policy formation that in turn leads to
formally promulgated rules).
242
See Basel Regulatory Framework, FEDERAL RESERVE, http://www.federalreserve.gov/
bankinforeg/basel/default.htm (last updated Oct. 25, 2013). One of us has also made the
following observations regarding Basel III in a previous article. See Zaring, supra note 30.
243
See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, U.S. Implementation of Basel II: Lessons for Informal International Lawmaking, in INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 1, 16 (Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses
Wessel & Jan Wouters eds., 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1879391 (“[T]he
only formal constraints on implementation [of Basel II] arose from US administrative
law.”). This is not to suggest that the American response to the second iteration of Basel
was the only problem with that particular accord. See Jeffery Atik, Basel II: A Post-Crisis
Post-Mortem, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 731, 734–35 (2011) (identifying three
weaknesses in Basel II, specifically “the illusion of safety that Basel II engendered—an illusion that compliance with Basel II meant that bank capital would be ‘adequate’ to withstand a crisis;” “the use of credit ratings (as a proxy for credit sensitivity) to determine the
regulatory capital needed to support the holding of particular financial assets;” and “the
negative spiral effect resulting from the interplay between asset value declines occasioned
by market-to-market [sic] accounting and Basel II’s rigid capital demands, generally (and
perhaps incorrectly) described as procyclicality”).
244
Cf. Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting differences between rulemaking and adjudications and claiming the existence of a “judicial trend favoring rule-making over adjudication for development of new agency
policy”). For discussions about the nature of a rule and its comparative advantage (or not)
over adjudication, see Ronald M. Levin, The Case for (Finally) Fixing the APA’s Definition of
“Rule,” 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1077, 1080–83 (2004) (discussing the APA’s definition of what a
“rule” is); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383,
1390–98 (2004) (describing the implications of agency rulemaking versus adjudication);
David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 954–58 (1965) (discussing the consequences of “the form in
which a rule is declared”).
245
See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Implementation of Basel III Regulations: Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP), BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.
bis.org/bcbs/implementation.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
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the United States, are subject to a variety of constraints, culminating
in judicial review, and Basel itself offers virtually none of these
constraints.246
Nonetheless, under the foreign relations doctrines we have already discussed, Basel should pass muster for the same reasons that
ICANN, the GAC, and the Kimberley Process should pass muster. We
will not recount the steps of the argument here given that it tracks the
ones made in the context of other case studies. We merely note that
Basel represents the apportioning of a highly important domestic regulatory issue—the safety and soundness of the financial system—to a
global soft law process.
But in another way, it shows how congressional direction can constrain agencies from running riot on the global stage through the
commitment to soft law arrangements. When international standards
are not consistent with specific congressional direction, the international process, of course, must give way.247 Such is the case with the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, which set its own priorities for
the regulatory state. Dodd-Frank, for example, requires bank regulators to develop alternatives to the use of credit ratings in evaluating
the quality of bank reserve assets.248 But these alternatives are extremely hard to reconcile with the Basel III process’s commitment to
credit ratings of capital reserves.249 The quality of capital required
under Basel III makes extensive use of credit ratings, even as
Dodd-Frank underlines Congress’s clear instruction that American
regulators spurn them.250
Because here there is a stark conflict between the dictates of
Congress and of Basel III, Congress’s will must control regardless of
whether or not foreign relations law principles are brought to bear in
246
Cf. Verdier, supra note 240, at 1432–33 (noting that “[i]n recent years, TRNs such
as the Basel Committee have voluntarily adopted similar procedures [to APA
notice-and-comment procedures] in an effort to increase transparency,” but only discussing judicial review as a recourse against domestic agencies).
247
See, e.g., Swaine, supra note 183, at 1593–97 (discussing the primacy of federal legislation over agreements produced through international delegations, as evidenced by doctrines including non-self-execution and the last-in-time rule); Verdier, supra note 243, at 13
(noting Congress’s power to “nix” the implementation of the international standards set
out in Basel II).
248
For an overview of the issue, see Melvyn Westlake, Newsletter January 2011:
Dodd-Frank Bar on Ratings Hinders Basel III Adoption, GLOBAL RISK REGULATOR, http://www.
globalriskregulator.com/article.php?pgkey=2483 (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
249
For the Committee’s rule on credit ratings, see Arturo Estrella et al., Credit Ratings
and Complementary Sources of Credit Quality Information (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Working Paper No. 3, 2000), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp3.htm.
250
See Richard Smith, Basel III vs Dodd-Frank on Ratings Agencies and Risk Weights, NAKED
CAPITALISM (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2010/09/basel-iii-vs-doddfrank-on-ratings-agencies-and-risk-weights.html (noting the “striking disagreement” between Dodd-Frank and Basel III in their respective approaches to ratings agencies).
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the matter. And so in this way, despite the need for soft law deference
in financial regulation, the way to avoid soft law constraints is clear: as
some banking lawyers have observed, “Dodd-Frank’s capital rules will
necessarily be consistent with some of the Basel capital requirements
and inconsistent with other Basel capital requirements.”251
D. Sports Arbitration and Due Process
A foreign relations perspective can also go some distance toward
justifying individualized determinations (as opposed to the broad
rules set forth by ICANN’s GAC and the Basel process) made by soft
law institutions. It makes peace with international soft law process as
sufficiently consistent with domestic due process standards.
A small but high-profile problem faced by American athletes concerns the relationship between domestic due process and the Court
for Arbitration in Sport (CAS), which handles a number of
sports-related adjudication and, by Article 61 of the Olympic Charter,
all disputes arising from the Olympic Games.252 The American government has created a number of entities like the U.S. Olympic Committee and other national sports organizations that in turn have
agreed with their foreign counterparts to resolve disputes in international competition through the CAS as the court of last resort.253
Well-known American athletes, such as the Tour de France winner
Floyd Landis, have lost prominent cases before the CAS.254
The CAS is a very fast-moving tribunal that Lorenzo Casini has
suggested is beginning to develop a “Lex Sportiva.”255 As James
Nafziger has explained, the CAS
addresses such important issues as the eligibility and suspension of
athletes, the adequacy of protections for individual athletes during
drug testing, breaches of contract between an athlete and a sports
251
Jerome Walker et al., Reconciling the Dodd-Frank and Basel Committee Capital Requirements, 129 BANKING L.J. 627, 643 (2012).
252
See Olympic Charter, supra note 63. The CAS has held, for example, that lifetime
doping bans are inconsistent with the charter. See Colin Jackson, London 2012: Dwain
Chambers Eligible After Court Ruling, BBC SPORT (Apr. 30, 2012, 8:38 PM), http://www.bbc.
co.uk/sport/0/olympics/17853070.
253
See Jason Gubi, Note, The Olympic Binding Arbitration Clause and the Court of Arbitration for Sport: An Analysis of Due Process Concerns, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 997, 1003, 1007, 1011 (2008).
254
See Ian Austen, Landis Loses Final Doping Appeal, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2008), http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/sports/othersports/01cycling.html (“The Court of
Arbitration for Sport . . . upheld a United States Anti-Doping Agency panel’s decision that
synthetic testosterone contributed to his victory.”).
255
“The number of decisions rendered by the CAS has increased to the point that a set
of principles and rules have been created specifically to address sport: This ‘judge-made
sport law’ has been called lex sportiva.” Lorenzo Casini, The Making of a Lex Sportiva by the
Court of Arbitration for Sport, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1317, 1319 (2011).
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club, the validity of contracts for the sale of sports equipment, and
the nationality of athletes for purposes of competition.256

The CAS renders its decisions within days, and it upholds real deprivations of the property and liberty (like bans on competition and the
forfeiture of medals, and the accompanying stigmatization as a cheat)
of athletes, charged with, say, drug-related offenses, including
American ones,257 without permitting them to receive the full benefits
of what might ordinarily constitute bedrock procedural values in the
United States.258 As Michael Straubel has said, “From the athletes’
perspective, the cases are evidence of a system that ignores basic notions of due process by incorrectly assigning burdens, issues punishment before holding a hearing and uses biased arbitrators.”259 Others
have also expressed concern about reconciling the process requirements of individualized determinations with the value of having a
cross-border adjudicator.260
Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe that the CAS offers benefits to the world of sport, including placing American and foreign
athletes on a level procedural playing field. Moreover, a multinational rule enforcer like the tribunal is more likely to be immune from
charges of parochialism than domestic courts hearing the complaints
of domestic athletic heroes would be.
A foreign relations perspective can justify the turn to the CAS and
the possible due process risks in a way that administrative law might
not.261 Administrative law has developed a rather specific set of requirements for the sorts of individualized determinations made by the
256
James A.R. Nafziger, Dispute Resolution in the Arena of International Sports Competition,
50 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 161, 167 (2002).
257
See Abbas Ravjani, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: A Subtle Form of International Delegation, 2 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 241, 248 (2009).
258
See id. at 242–47.
259
Michael S. Straubel, Doping Due Process: A Critique of the Doping Control Process in
International Sport, 106 DICK. L. REV. 523, 531 (2002). Indeed, the track athlete Mary Slaney
challenged an international sporting determination in federal court, although not on due
process grounds. See Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 591 (7th Cir.
2001).
260
See, e.g., Kingsbury et al., supra note 72, at 23, 45–46 (noting that “[s]ignificant
normative and practical problems arise in proposals to extend administrative law approaches” to organizations such as the CAS).
261
But it might: the U.S. Olympic Committee is exempt from the process requirements that government agencies must provide. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S.
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542–44 (1987) (holding that the U.S. Olympic Committee
is a private corporation and not a government agent). A similar rule would apply to any
athletic organization set up as a private entity, rather than a government agency, provided
that the private entity was not overly “entwined” with the government entity. See id. If
American athletic federations are not state actors, they need not provide the athletes they
sponsor with due process, or any process at all not required by other federal laws. But see
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001) (concluding that a state athletic association was a state actor because of the degree of oversight
provided by the state education department).
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CAS. Courts evaluate the risk of error through the procedures used
by the institution and the likely value of additional or alternative procedural safeguards, balancing the government’s interest in finality
against the individual’s interest in more process. This is the Mathews
test discussed in Part II of this Article.262
But under foreign relations law, the President’s authority to enter
into executive agreements that resolve claims without necessarily providing strict levels of process helps to justify American participation in
the CAS. As the Supreme Court reminded us in Garamendi, the government has precisely this sort of authority.263 It has used it to consign claims against the Iranian government in the wake of the Iranian
Revolution to an international tribunal; to settle claims against the
Soviet government for nationalizing Russian industries, some of which
were supported with American investments; and to discourage court
claims for property lost during the Holocaust in France, Germany,
and Austria.264
By the same token, American government or quasi-government
agencies surely have the right to assign disputes raised by their athletes regarding international competitions to an international process.
The case for the CAS shows how soft law commitments to tribunals
that make individualized determinations can overcome due process
hurdles that might be insurmountable in the domestic context.
E. Climate Change: The Future
So far, we have focused on areas where a clear international soft
law process already exists. International environmental law has historically followed a different pattern, however, with a heavy reliance on
treaties.265 Soft law agreements have typically served as precursors to
these treaties rather than as substitutes.266 While soft law engagement
does happen at the international level, there is a lessened assumption
of direct implementation, and the EPA and other executive branch
environmental actors have not proved to be as focused on soft law as
agencies like the FDA and Treasury.
But this may change, and our foreign relations lens would provide the EPA with direction as to areas where it should be presumed
to have the authority to enter into cross-border arrangements that address climate change, as well as guidance as to where congressional
262

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
See cases cited supra notes 151–52 for a discussion of this power.
264
See id.
265
See Palmer, supra note 91 (explaining that international hard law in the environmental law context has come primarily from treaties).
266
For example, the hard law Montreal Protocol was preceded by the soft law Helsinki
Declaration on the Protection of the Ozone Layer. See id. at 269–70.
263
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direction admits of no room for an international collaborative process. Climate change is an issue that must be tackled internationally,
yet achieving a meaningful hard law agreement that the United States
and its treaty partners can ratify under their constitutional processes
has proved exceptionally difficult.
One or more long-term soft law agreements might prove the most
feasible solution.267 The most high-profile international agreement in
recent years on the subject, the Copenhagen Accord, was a soft law
agreement, although one that was intended as a precursor to a hard
law agreement and that, from the U.S. perspective, could not be implemented without congressional legislation.268
Drawing on foreign relations law principles as well as administrative law principles would maximize the scope of the executive
branch’s ability to make and implement a long-term soft law agreement on climate change. To see how, consider a soft law agreement
under which the United States agrees to a certain level of emissions
reductions, such as a pledge to reduce its emission levels by seventeen
percent from its 2005 emissions.269 We think that the executive
branch could undertake such a commitment under its soft law powers
267
See, e.g., Andrew N. Keller, From Counterterrorism to Climate Change: Are Treaties Necessary to Solve International Problems?, 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 185, 187–89 (2010) (discussing the treaty-based approach toward climate change). In an interesting example of
how foreign relations law approaches can ignore soft law, several scholars have discussed
how the United States might avoid the treaty problem by entering into other forms of hard
international law agreements—sole executive agreements and congressional-executive
agreements—without considering the prospect of soft law. See, e.g., Chang, supra
note 170, at 341–44 (discussing the use of executive agreements as alternatives to
treaties); Nigel Purvis, The Case for Climate Protection Authority, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 1007,
1027–37 (2009) (comparing sole executive agreements, treaty-executive agreements, and
congressional-executive agreements for use as substitutes for treaties). Yet a soft law approach offers greater scope for the executive branch than a sole executive agreement,
because soft law agreements are not currently subject to the same limit on importance that
is understood to exist for sole executive agreements. See supra note 174 and accompanying
text; see also Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 18, at 509–10, 582–83 (noting the prospect that
a soft law agreement can avoid the constitutional limits set on sole executive agreements,
although arguing that some international soft law agreements should require congressional involvement).
268
Among other things, the Copenhagen Accord included market mechanisms and
expectations for appropriations that would have required congressional action. See
Copenhagen Accord, Dec. 18, 2009, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Rep. of the Conf. of the Parties on its 15th Sess., Dec. 7–19, 2009, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.l, at 4–7 (Mar. 30, 2010), available at http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf.
269
This was the level the United States specified in its submission pursuant to the
Copenhagen Accord, id., although it conditioned this submission on congressional action.
See Letter and Attachment from Todd Stern, U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change, to Yvo
de Boer, Exec. Sec’y, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (Jan. 28, 2010),
available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/application/
pdf/unitedstatescphaccord_app.1.pdf (specifying the seventeen-percent goal and conditioning that goal on pending legislation).
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despite uncertainty about whether statutory change would be needed
to implement it.270 We also believe the executive branch would have
tools available to implement this commitment into U.S. law as it now
stands. Under a purely administrative law framework, the prospects
for implementation would be limited to considering what the Clean
Air Act and other relevant statutes now authorize the EPA and other
agencies to do as a matter of administrative law. By also drawing on
foreign relations law principles, the executive branch could claim additional deference in the application of these statutes and could potentially benefit from the President’s independent foreign policy
powers.271
While the text of the Clean Air Act fixes the EPA’s power to regulate, interpretations can vary as to what this text permits the EPA to
do. Framing climate change as a foreign relations issue could lead
administrators and judges to take a wider interpretation of the EPA’s
discretion, either by explicitly adding the foreign relations law deference canons to the administrative law deference canons or by tacitly
affecting how they apply these latter canons. Indeed, this issue arose
in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court’s pathbreaking decision
on climate change.272 The majority favored a strictly administrative
law approach, emphasizing that “while the President has broad authority in foreign affairs, that authority does not extend to the refusal
to execute domestic laws.”273 In dissent, however, Justice Scalia
and the three justices who joined him suggested that the EPA
Administrator could “and ought to take into account[ ] . . . the impact
[EPA regulations] would have . . . on foreign policy” in deciding
whether or not to make a judgment about carbon dioxide emissions.274 On the particular issue at stake in that case, the statute was
clear enough to justify the majority’s ultimate conclusion, but the suggested approach could affect the interpretation of other statutory provisions on the margin.
For example, the EPA regulates emissions from new power plants
by seeking “the degree of emission limitation achievable through the
application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking
into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair
quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements)
270
But see Chang, supra note 170, at 364–65 (concluding that the President likely
would not have the power to enter into a binding sole executive agreement along these
lines).
271
See id. at 353 (suggesting that the sole-organ doctrine provides the President with
independent authority to engage in information sharing and science and technology cooperation across borders).
272
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534, 552 (2007).
273
Id. at 534.
274
Id. at 552 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.”275
Suppose that in determining the “best system of emission reduction,”
the EPA took into account the importance of meeting the hypothetical seventeen percent national emission reduction described earlier
because it reasoned that meeting this cap would encourage other
countries to meet their caps and therefore promote the best overall
outcome.276 Would this be permissible? From a purely administrative
law approach, a court could go either way on whether the statute requires the EPA to focus only on balancing the level of emissions with
the cost and other factors mentioned, or whether, instead, the statute
gave the EPA discretion to draw upon other factors or to interpret
these specific factors so broadly as to justify the EPA’s actions. Recognizing that an executive-branch foreign policy interest consistent with
the overall statutory goal of emissions reduction is at stake, however,
might lead a court to give special deference to the EPA’s interpretation, and this deference might tip the balance. Foreign relations law
principles would matter here only on the margin—but the margin
might matter. Given the low prospects of future congressional support for any measures that mitigate climate change, the executive
branch needs to consider every option for maximizing its existing
powers to address the issue.
CONCLUSION
Many observers view the globalization of law as a threat to transparency and accountability. Because the ordinary doctrines of administrative law are concerned with those two subjects above all else,
reconciling regulatory globalization and domestic administrative law
has been hard to do. Indeed, some readers will be wondering if the
strongest argument against our proposal is not whether it is possible to
275
42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2006). The EPA is presently undertaking a rulemaking
under these provisions. By contrast, the standard for emissions from new vehicles is sufficiently strict that a foreign affairs approach may not give the Administrator any additional
flexibility. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006) (providing that the EPA is to set “standards [for new vehicle emissions] which reflect the greatest degree of emission reduction
achievable through the application of technology which the Administrator determines will
be available”).
276
The EPA has engaged in reasoning along these lines in setting requirements for
other forms of pollution under the Clean Air Act. See Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d
404, 409, 412 n.3 (2004) (describing how the EPA reasoned, with regard to a similarly
worded statutory provision, that waiting for the adoption of international standards could
“maximize the control of emissions from U.S. and foreign vessels,” although not reaching
the extent to which the EPA could permissibly consider this issue) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1221, 1229–30 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (concluding that the EPA could permissibly be influenced by the standards
called for by the International Civil Airline Organization in setting emission standards for
airplanes).
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devise a doctrinal defense of the explosion of global soft law, but
whether it is worth doing.
We endorse regulatory globalization and posit that a cosmopolitan approach to what governments must do is desirable—indeed, it
might be the only viable approach. Now that the world is truly flat,277
financial crises are evidently contagious,278 and global warming cares
not for national borders, it is naive to hope that regulators can meet
their regulatory missions without cooperating with their foreign counterparts. By the same token, it is obstinate—and isolationist—to hope
that sticking within the country’s borders could result in a fulfilled set
of regulatory objectives. Moreover, we cannot depend solely on the
passage of international treaties because of the delays in negotiation,
the problems with ratification, and the control of the process by diplomats rather than experts.
In such a world, a crucial alternative way forward is through soft
law agreements that cross borders. For this alternative to succeed,
those agreements must be given a stable legal footing. In our view, it
is possible to root the legitimacy of international governance in traditional domestic institutions using traditional doctrines, though we
have indicated some ways that those doctrines must be modernized.
There is more to be done to make regulatory globalization domestically accountable, of course. Congressional action, for example,
is always valuable, and it makes administrative soft law much easier to
justify. But in some cases, Congress has not made such an endorsement, and waiting for it is something that agencies cannot afford to
do if they want to meet their regulatory objectives. They need a basis
for their increasingly international remits, and they need it now.
Our approach offers them a solution by taking the problems
posed by traditional doctrines of administrative law and the separation
of powers seriously but showing how the extra degrees of deference
and independence afforded to regulatory initiatives taken in the
course of foreign affairs can mitigate some of the concerns of those
doctrines. Our approach also reorients a literature—the foreign relations literature—that, in our view, needs to readjust its focus as to
both substance and process. While the topics of war, human rights,
and traditional international legal forms that currently drive the literature are undeniably important, much of the future of American foreign policy lies in the ways in which its regulators match their
standards to those of the rest of the world.
277
See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2005).
278
See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (5th ed. 2005) (describing the contagious nature of financial
panics).
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Soft law has become a critical part of the foreign relations toolkit.
It is accordingly necessary for foreign relations law to recognize and to
think critically about how foreign policy is carried out by actors within
the executive branch other than the President—actors whose actions
are to some extent subject to agency mandates set by statute. Even as
the executive branch splinters and agencies pursue international programs that are difficult for the White House to control, the need to
think of the authority of the President’s delegates in the administrative state as stemming from a more unitary vision of that branch is a
paradoxical but vital move.

